Bibliography
Dominguez, Jorge. “The Future of Inter-American Relations: States, Challenges, and Likely Responses”. The Future of Inter-American Relations. New York: Routledge, 2000.
Kellogg, Paul. “Regional Integration in Latin America: Dawn of an Alternative to Neoliberalism?” New Political Science. Volume 29, Number 2, June 2007.
Montaruli, Silvana. “El concepto de integración en el discurso de Simón Bolívar”. Las relaciones interamericanas. Continuidades y cambios. Buenos Aires: Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales - CLACSO, 2008.
Smith, Joseph. “The United States and Latin America. A history of American diplomacy, 1776-2000”. New York: Routledge, 2005.
Thursday, March 18, 2010
Tuesday, March 16, 2010
Winners and Losers of Venezuela’s Coercive Policy for Presidential Addresses
By COHA Research Associate Matthew Lackey and COHA Senior Research Fellow Denise Stanley
1 Asamblea Nacional de la Republica Boliviariana de Venezuela Decreta, Ley de Responsibilidad Social en Radio y Television, Gaceta Oficial 38.333, December 12, 2005.
2 "Broadcast battles; Venezuela.(Venezuela's broadcasting battles)," The Economist [US], July 21, 2007: 39US. Academic OneFile, (accessed February 23, 2010).
3 Ministerio del Poder Popular para las Obras Publicas y Vivienda, Providencia Administritiva, Directorio de Responsibilidad Social, Técnica sobre los Servicios de Producción Nacional Audiovisual, December 22, 2009, Article 2.
4 Ministerio del Poder Popular para las Obras Publicas y Vivienda, Providencia Administritiva, Directorio de Responsibilidad Social, Técnica sobre los Servicios de Producción Nacional Audiovisual, December 22, 2009, Article 3.
5 RNV Web Press, “RCTV broke the law on repeated occasions,” Correo del Orinoco, January 26, 2010, http://www.rnv.gov.ve/noticias/index.php?act=ST&f=31&t=118336, (accessed 28 February 2010).
6 Christopher Toothaker, “Anti-Chávez TV Channel Removed from Cable,” Associated Press, accessed from Forbes.com, http://www.forbes.com/feeds/ap/2010/01/24/general-lt-venezuela-media_7298640.html, (accessed February 21, 2009).
7 Tamara Pearson, “Venezuela’s Chavez Calls for Calm after Violent Pro-RCTV Protests,” Venezuelanalysis.com, http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/news/5113, February 2, 2010, (accessed February 21, 2009).
8 Fabiola Sanchez, “Venezuelan Police Scatter Protesters as Chavez Supporters Marks Anniversary of his 1992 Coup,” The Canadian Press, February 4, 2010.
9 Agencia Bolivariana de Noticias, “Autorización para marcha opositora del 4F fue negada,” February 3, 2010, http://www.abn.info.ve/noticia.php?articulo=218748&lee=1, (accessed February 21, 2010).
10 Washington Office on Latin America, “WOLA Faults Suspension of Cable TV Stations in Venezuela; Sees Deliberate Effort to Stifle Government Critic,” 29 January, 2009, http://www.wola.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=viewp&id=1048&Itemid=8, (accessed 28 February 2010).
11 Fabiola Sanchez, “Owners of anti-Chavez TV to launch new channel, seek return to Venezuela's television sets,” The Canadian Press, February 22, 2010.
12 Christopher Toothaker, “Venezuela Opposition Protests Domestic Woes, Chavez Supporters Mount Counter Demonstration,” The Canadian Press, January 23, 2010.
13 "Venezuela," World Mark Encyclopedia of the Nations 2007, http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-2586700178.html#MEDIA Accessed March 16, 2010.
14 Christopher Toothaker, “Anti-Chávez TV Channel Removed from Cable,” Associated Press accessed from Forbes.com. January 24, 2010. http://www.forbes.com/feeds/ap/2010/01/24/general-lt-venezuela-media_7298640.html, (accessed February 21, 2009).
15 World Bank. World Development Indicators Online. Subscription available at Http:// http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:21725423~pagePK:64133150~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html Accessed February 10, 2010.
16 Asamblea Nacional de la Republica Boliviariana de Venezuela Decreta, Ley de Responsibilidad Social en Radio y Television, Gaceta Oficial 38.333, December 12, 2005, Article 6.
17 Federal Communications Commission, “Obscene, indecent, and profane broadcasts,” http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/obscene.html (accessed February 23, 2010).
18 Asamblea Nacional de la Republica Boliviariana de Venezuela Decreta, Ley de Responsibilidad Social en Radio y Television, Gaceta Oficial 38.333, December 12, 2005, Article 10.
19 Personal communication
20 Federal Communications Commission, “The Emergency Alert System,” http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/eas.html (accessed February 23, 2010).
21 Federal Communications Commission, “The Emergency Alert System,” http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/eas.html (accessed February 23, 2010).
22 Cañizález, Andrés. “Media and government in Venezuela: what price freedom?” Media Development 2: 25-48, 2008.
23 Cañizález, Andrés. “Media and government in Venezuela: what price freedom?” Media Development 2: 25-48, 2008.
24 Organization of American States Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Democracy and Human Rights in Venezuela, December 30, 2009, available at http://cidh.org/pdf%20files/VENEZUELA%202009%20ENG.pdf, p. 87 paragraph 343.
25 Organization of American States Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Democracy and Human Rights in Venezuela, December 30, 2009, available at http://cidh.org/pdf%20files/VENEZUELA%202009%20ENG.pdf, p. 97 paragraph 373 .
26 Reporters Without Borders, “Presidential Speeches Should Have to be Broadcast by Just One Station,” February 3, 2010, http://www.rsf.org/Presidential-speeches-should-have.html, (accessed February 21, 2010).
27 David Edwards, "Chavez and RCTV: media enemies at home and abroad, " NACLA Report on the Americas 40.5 (Sept-Oct 2007): 51(2). Academic OneFile. Gale,
http://find.galegroup.com/gtx/infomark.do?&contentSet=IAC-Documents&type=retrieve&tabID=T002&prodId=AONE&docId=A168775819&source=gale&userGroupName=vic_regent&version=1.0>, (accessed February 23, 2010).
28 TeleSUR, “El Canal,” http://www.telesurtv.net/noticias/canal/index.php (accessed February 23, 2009).
BIBLIOGRAPHY
"Broadcast battles; Venezuela.(Venezuela's broadcasting battles)." The Economist [US] 21 July 2007: 39US. Academic OneFile. Web. 23 Feb. 2010.
Agencia Bolivariana de Noticias . “Embajador Chaderton respondió a las acusaciones de EEUU y Canadá por caso RCTV.” February 3, 2010. http://www.abn.info.ve/noticia.php?articulo=218759&lee=1. (Accessed February 21, 2010).
Agencia Bolivariana de Noticias. “Autorización para marcha opositora del 4F fue negada.” February 3, 2010. http://www.abn.info.ve/noticia.php?articulo=218748&lee=1 (Accessed February 21, 2010).
Asamblea Nacional de la Republica Boliviariana de Venezuela Decreta. Ley de Responsibilidad Social en Radio y Television. Gaceta Oficial 38.333. December 12, 2005.
Cañizález, Andrés. “Media and government in Venezuela: what price freedom?” Media Development 2: 25-48, 2008.
Edwards, David. "Chavez and RCTV: media enemies at home and abroad. " NACLA Report on the Americas. 40.5 (Sept-Oct 2007): 51(2). Academic OneFile. Gale. 23 Feb. 2010
.
Fabiola Sanchez, “Venezuelan police scatter protesters as Chavez supporters marks anniversary of his 1992 coup,” The Canadian Press, 02/04/2010,
Federal Communications Commission. “Obscene, indecent, and profane broadcasts.” Federal Communications Commission, http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/obscene.html (accessed February 23, 2010).
-----. “The Emergency Alert System.” Federal Communications Commission, http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/eas.html (accessed February 23, 2010).
Gale Group, 2010. Gale Virtual Reference Library, Venezuela Media. Http://go.galegroup.com Accessed February 10, 2010.
Ministerio del Poder Popular para las Obras Publicas y Vivienda. Providencia Administritiva. Directorio de Responsibilidad Social. Técnica sobre los Servicios de Producción Nacional Audiovisual. Ministerio del Poder Popular para las Obras Publicas y Vivienda. Providencia Administritiva. Directorio de Responsibilidad Social. December 22, 2009.
Organization of American States Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Democracy and Human Rights in Venezuela. Organization of American States. December 30, 2009. Available at http://cidh.org/pdf%20files/VENEZUELA%202009%20ENG.pdf. Associated Press. “Anti-Chávez TV Vows to Maintain Tough Stance.” The New York Times. February 12, 2010. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2010/02/12/world/AP-LT-Venezuela-Media.html?_r=1&emc=eta1.
Pearson, Tamara. “Venezuela’s Chávez Calls for Calm after Violent Pro-RCTV Protests.” Venezuelanalysis.com. February 2, 2010. http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/news/5113 (Accessed February 21, 2010).
Reporters Without Borders. “Five Cable TV Stations Allowed to Resume Broadcasting but RCTVI Still Suspended.” February 4, 2010. http://www.rsf.org/Six-tv-channels-suspended-over.html. (Accessed February 21, 2010).
Reporters Without Borders. “Presidential Speeches Should Have to be Broadcast by Just One Station.” February 3, 2010. http://www.rsf.org/Presidential-speeches-should-have.html. (Accessed February 21, 2010).
RNV Web Press, “RCTV broke the law on repeated occasions.” Correo del Orinoco. 26 January 2010. Accessed 28 February 2010. http://www.rnv.gov.ve/noticias/index.php?act=ST&f=31&t=118336.
Sanchez, Fabiola. “Owners of anti-Chavez TV to launch new channel, seek return to Venezuela's television sets.” The Canadian Press. 2/22/2010.
TeleSUR. “El Canal.” TeleSur, http://www.telesurtv.net/noticias/canal/index.php (accessed February 23, 2009).
TelesSUR Website.
Toothaker, Christopher. “Anti-Chávez TV Channel Removed from Cable.” Associated Press accessed from Forbes.com. January 24, 2010. http://www.forbes.com/feeds/ap/2010/01/24/general-lt-venezuela-media_7298640.html. (Accessed February 21, 2009).
-----. “Venezuela Opposition Protests Domestic Woes, Chavez Supporters Mount Counter Demonstration.” The Canadian Press. 01/23/2010
"Venezuela." World Mark Encyclopedia of the Nations 2007. http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-2586700178.html#MEDIA (accessed March 16, 2010).
Washington Office on Latin America. “WOLA Faults Suspension of Cable TV Stations in Venezuela; Sees Deliberate Effort to Stifle Government Critic.” January 29, 2009. http://www.wola.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=viewp&id=1048&Itemid=8, (accessed 28 February 2010).
World Bank. World Development Indicators Online. Subscription available at Http:// http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:21725423~pagePK:64133150~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html Accessed February 10, 2010
1 Asamblea Nacional de la Republica Boliviariana de Venezuela Decreta, Ley de Responsibilidad Social en Radio y Television, Gaceta Oficial 38.333, December 12, 2005.
2 "Broadcast battles; Venezuela.(Venezuela's broadcasting battles)," The Economist [US], July 21, 2007: 39US. Academic OneFile, (accessed February 23, 2010).
3 Ministerio del Poder Popular para las Obras Publicas y Vivienda, Providencia Administritiva, Directorio de Responsibilidad Social, Técnica sobre los Servicios de Producción Nacional Audiovisual, December 22, 2009, Article 2.
4 Ministerio del Poder Popular para las Obras Publicas y Vivienda, Providencia Administritiva, Directorio de Responsibilidad Social, Técnica sobre los Servicios de Producción Nacional Audiovisual, December 22, 2009, Article 3.
5 RNV Web Press, “RCTV broke the law on repeated occasions,” Correo del Orinoco, January 26, 2010, http://www.rnv.gov.ve/noticias/index.php?act=ST&f=31&t=118336, (accessed 28 February 2010).
6 Christopher Toothaker, “Anti-Chávez TV Channel Removed from Cable,” Associated Press, accessed from Forbes.com, http://www.forbes.com/feeds/ap/2010/01/24/general-lt-venezuela-media_7298640.html, (accessed February 21, 2009).
7 Tamara Pearson, “Venezuela’s Chavez Calls for Calm after Violent Pro-RCTV Protests,” Venezuelanalysis.com, http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/news/5113, February 2, 2010, (accessed February 21, 2009).
8 Fabiola Sanchez, “Venezuelan Police Scatter Protesters as Chavez Supporters Marks Anniversary of his 1992 Coup,” The Canadian Press, February 4, 2010.
9 Agencia Bolivariana de Noticias, “Autorización para marcha opositora del 4F fue negada,” February 3, 2010, http://www.abn.info.ve/noticia.php?articulo=218748&lee=1, (accessed February 21, 2010).
10 Washington Office on Latin America, “WOLA Faults Suspension of Cable TV Stations in Venezuela; Sees Deliberate Effort to Stifle Government Critic,” 29 January, 2009, http://www.wola.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=viewp&id=1048&Itemid=8, (accessed 28 February 2010).
11 Fabiola Sanchez, “Owners of anti-Chavez TV to launch new channel, seek return to Venezuela's television sets,” The Canadian Press, February 22, 2010.
12 Christopher Toothaker, “Venezuela Opposition Protests Domestic Woes, Chavez Supporters Mount Counter Demonstration,” The Canadian Press, January 23, 2010.
13 "Venezuela," World Mark Encyclopedia of the Nations 2007, http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-2586700178.html#MEDIA Accessed March 16, 2010.
14 Christopher Toothaker, “Anti-Chávez TV Channel Removed from Cable,” Associated Press accessed from Forbes.com. January 24, 2010. http://www.forbes.com/feeds/ap/2010/01/24/general-lt-venezuela-media_7298640.html, (accessed February 21, 2009).
15 World Bank. World Development Indicators Online. Subscription available at Http:// http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:21725423~pagePK:64133150~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html Accessed February 10, 2010.
16 Asamblea Nacional de la Republica Boliviariana de Venezuela Decreta, Ley de Responsibilidad Social en Radio y Television, Gaceta Oficial 38.333, December 12, 2005, Article 6.
17 Federal Communications Commission, “Obscene, indecent, and profane broadcasts,” http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/obscene.html (accessed February 23, 2010).
18 Asamblea Nacional de la Republica Boliviariana de Venezuela Decreta, Ley de Responsibilidad Social en Radio y Television, Gaceta Oficial 38.333, December 12, 2005, Article 10.
19 Personal communication
20 Federal Communications Commission, “The Emergency Alert System,” http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/eas.html (accessed February 23, 2010).
21 Federal Communications Commission, “The Emergency Alert System,” http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/eas.html (accessed February 23, 2010).
22 Cañizález, Andrés. “Media and government in Venezuela: what price freedom?” Media Development 2: 25-48, 2008.
23 Cañizález, Andrés. “Media and government in Venezuela: what price freedom?” Media Development 2: 25-48, 2008.
24 Organization of American States Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Democracy and Human Rights in Venezuela, December 30, 2009, available at http://cidh.org/pdf%20files/VENEZUELA%202009%20ENG.pdf, p. 87 paragraph 343.
25 Organization of American States Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Democracy and Human Rights in Venezuela, December 30, 2009, available at http://cidh.org/pdf%20files/VENEZUELA%202009%20ENG.pdf, p. 97 paragraph 373 .
26 Reporters Without Borders, “Presidential Speeches Should Have to be Broadcast by Just One Station,” February 3, 2010, http://www.rsf.org/Presidential-speeches-should-have.html, (accessed February 21, 2010).
27 David Edwards, "Chavez and RCTV: media enemies at home and abroad, " NACLA Report on the Americas 40.5 (Sept-Oct 2007): 51(2). Academic OneFile. Gale,
http://find.galegroup.com/gtx/infomark.do?&contentSet=IAC-Documents&type=retrieve&tabID=T002&prodId=AONE&docId=A168775819&source=gale&userGroupName=vic_regent&version=1.0>, (accessed February 23, 2010).
28 TeleSUR, “El Canal,” http://www.telesurtv.net/noticias/canal/index.php (accessed February 23, 2009).
BIBLIOGRAPHY
"Broadcast battles; Venezuela.(Venezuela's broadcasting battles)." The Economist [US] 21 July 2007: 39US. Academic OneFile. Web. 23 Feb. 2010.
Agencia Bolivariana de Noticias . “Embajador Chaderton respondió a las acusaciones de EEUU y Canadá por caso RCTV.” February 3, 2010. http://www.abn.info.ve/noticia.php?articulo=218759&lee=1. (Accessed February 21, 2010).
Agencia Bolivariana de Noticias. “Autorización para marcha opositora del 4F fue negada.” February 3, 2010. http://www.abn.info.ve/noticia.php?articulo=218748&lee=1 (Accessed February 21, 2010).
Asamblea Nacional de la Republica Boliviariana de Venezuela Decreta. Ley de Responsibilidad Social en Radio y Television. Gaceta Oficial 38.333. December 12, 2005.
Cañizález, Andrés. “Media and government in Venezuela: what price freedom?” Media Development 2: 25-48, 2008.
Edwards, David. "Chavez and RCTV: media enemies at home and abroad. " NACLA Report on the Americas. 40.5 (Sept-Oct 2007): 51(2). Academic OneFile. Gale. 23 Feb. 2010
Fabiola Sanchez, “Venezuelan police scatter protesters as Chavez supporters marks anniversary of his 1992 coup,” The Canadian Press, 02/04/2010,
Federal Communications Commission. “Obscene, indecent, and profane broadcasts.” Federal Communications Commission, http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/obscene.html (accessed February 23, 2010).
-----. “The Emergency Alert System.” Federal Communications Commission, http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/eas.html (accessed February 23, 2010).
Gale Group, 2010. Gale Virtual Reference Library, Venezuela Media. Http://go.galegroup.com Accessed February 10, 2010.
Ministerio del Poder Popular para las Obras Publicas y Vivienda. Providencia Administritiva. Directorio de Responsibilidad Social. Técnica sobre los Servicios de Producción Nacional Audiovisual. Ministerio del Poder Popular para las Obras Publicas y Vivienda. Providencia Administritiva. Directorio de Responsibilidad Social. December 22, 2009.
Organization of American States Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Democracy and Human Rights in Venezuela. Organization of American States. December 30, 2009. Available at http://cidh.org/pdf%20files/VENEZUELA%202009%20ENG.pdf. Associated Press. “Anti-Chávez TV Vows to Maintain Tough Stance.” The New York Times. February 12, 2010. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2010/02/12/world/AP-LT-Venezuela-Media.html?_r=1&emc=eta1.
Pearson, Tamara. “Venezuela’s Chávez Calls for Calm after Violent Pro-RCTV Protests.” Venezuelanalysis.com. February 2, 2010. http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/news/5113 (Accessed February 21, 2010).
Reporters Without Borders. “Five Cable TV Stations Allowed to Resume Broadcasting but RCTVI Still Suspended.” February 4, 2010. http://www.rsf.org/Six-tv-channels-suspended-over.html. (Accessed February 21, 2010).
Reporters Without Borders. “Presidential Speeches Should Have to be Broadcast by Just One Station.” February 3, 2010. http://www.rsf.org/Presidential-speeches-should-have.html. (Accessed February 21, 2010).
RNV Web Press, “RCTV broke the law on repeated occasions.” Correo del Orinoco. 26 January 2010. Accessed 28 February 2010. http://www.rnv.gov.ve/noticias/index.php?act=ST&f=31&t=118336.
Sanchez, Fabiola. “Owners of anti-Chavez TV to launch new channel, seek return to Venezuela's television sets.” The Canadian Press. 2/22/2010.
TeleSUR. “El Canal.” TeleSur, http://www.telesurtv.net/noticias/canal/index.php (accessed February 23, 2009).
TelesSUR Website.
Toothaker, Christopher. “Anti-Chávez TV Channel Removed from Cable.” Associated Press accessed from Forbes.com. January 24, 2010. http://www.forbes.com/feeds/ap/2010/01/24/general-lt-venezuela-media_7298640.html. (Accessed February 21, 2009).
-----. “Venezuela Opposition Protests Domestic Woes, Chavez Supporters Mount Counter Demonstration.” The Canadian Press. 01/23/2010
"Venezuela." World Mark Encyclopedia of the Nations 2007. http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-2586700178.html#MEDIA (accessed March 16, 2010).
Washington Office on Latin America. “WOLA Faults Suspension of Cable TV Stations in Venezuela; Sees Deliberate Effort to Stifle Government Critic.” January 29, 2009. http://www.wola.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=viewp&id=1048&Itemid=8, (accessed 28 February 2010).
World Bank. World Development Indicators Online. Subscription available at Http:// http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:21725423~pagePK:64133150~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html Accessed February 10, 2010
Monday, March 01, 2010
Cuba’s Health Politics: At Home and Abroad
1 For a full discussion of the history, ideology and organisation of the Cuban health system, and its medical diplomacy and biotechnology development, see Julie M. Feinsilver, Healing the Masses: Cuban Health Politics at Home and Abroad, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.
2 Ibid., pp. 37-40.
3 Médicos de la familia y cobertura según provincias, Anuario Estadístico de Salud 2007, Fuente: Registro de profesionales de la salud y Dirección de Atención Primaria, 2007, http://bvs.sld.cu and Oficina Nacional de Estadisticas, Anuario Estadística 2008 (Edición 2009), Tables 19.1, 19.4 and 19.5 Coverage was reorganized in late 2007. There were 932 fewer family doctors in 2008 than 2006, which could be due to a number of factors such as natural attrition, further specialization, system rationalization or defection while abroad.
4 Feinsilver, Healing the Masses, pp. 117-18.
5 Ibid., pp. 40-41, 44-47.
6 Ibid., pp. 58-62, 122-55.
7 ‘La Reforma Del Sector de la Salud’, available from http://www.dne.sld.cu.
8 Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), Health in the Americas 2007, Washington: PAHO, 2007, available from http://www.paho.org.
9 Ibid.
10 Table 87, ‘Ejecución del presupuesto y gasto por habitante 1959, 1960, 1965, 1970 – 2006’, Año anuario 2006, Fuente: Registros administrativos de la Dirección Nacional de Finanzas y Contabilidad.
11 República de Cuba, Dirección Nacional de Estadística del Ministerio de Salud Pública, Sistema Nacional de Salud Políticas, Estrategias y Programas. Havana, Cuba, December 1998. ‘La Reforma Del Sector de la Salud’.
12 PAHO, Health Situation in the Americas. Basic Indicators 2007, p. 4.
13 Republica de Cuba, Ministerio de Salud Pública, Proyecciones de la Salud Pública en Cuba para el 2015, Havana: Editorial Ciencias Médicas, February 2006, p. 64.
14 Abelardo Ramírez Márquez and Cándido López Pardo, ‘A Monitoring System for Health Equity in Cuba’, MEDICC Review, 7(9), Nov/Dec 2005, available from http://ww.medicc.org.
15 Ministerio de Salud Pública, Proyecciones.
16 Republica de Cuba, Oficina Nacional de Estadísticas, Anuario Estadístico de Cuba 2008 (Edición 2009), available from http://www.one.cu/aec2008/esp/20080618_tabla_cuadro.htm.
17 Feinsilver, Healing the Masses, Chapter 6, ‘Cuban Medical Diplomacy’ (on comparison with the former Soviet bloc and China, see pp. 159-160).
18 Interview with Carlos Lovo, Advisor to the Salvadoran Minister of Health at that time, Washington, 30 April 2009.
19 Cuban Cooperation, Website of the Cuban Governmental Cooperation in the Health Sector, http://www.cubacoop.com (available in Spanish and English); and ‘Cubans to help boost local health sector’, Jamaica Observer, 10 May 2008.
20 Feinsilver, Healing The Masses, Chapter 6.
21 ‘Cuban medical cooperation in South Africa highlighted’, Cuba Direct (online),
26 May 2009, available from http://emba.cubaminrex.cu.
22 http://www.cubacoop.com.
23 Prensa Latina, 11 April 2008.
24 http://www.cubacoop.com.
25 AFP, ‘Massive UN vote in support of lifting US embargo on Cuba’, 29 October
30 2008.
26 http://www.cubacoop.com.
27 Ibid.
28 Aleksei Aleksandrov, ‘Health care: The secrets of Cuban medicine’, Argumenty i Fakty (mass-circulation weekly), Moscow, 17 September 2003, reprinted in World Press Review, 50(12), 2003; and ‘Over 20,000 children from Chernobyl rehabilitated in Cuba,’ Caribbean Net News, 2 April 2009, available from http://www.caribbeannetnews.com.
29 Feinsilver, ‘La diplomacia médica cubana: cuando la izquierda lo ha hecho bien
[Cuban medical diplomacy: When the left has got it right]’, Foreign Affairs en
Español, 6(4), 2006, pp. 81-94. The English version is available from http://
www.coha.org.
30 Feinsilver, ‘Cuba as a world medical power: the politics of symbolism’, Latin American Research Review, 24(2), 1989, p. 1; and Healing the Masses.
31 Feinsilver, ‘Médicos por petroleo: la diplomacia médica cubana recibe apoyo de sus amigos [Oil-for-Doctors: Cuban medical diplomacy gets a little help from a Venezuelan friend]’, Nueva Sociedad, 216(July-August), 2008, available in both English and Spanish from http://www.nuso.org; and Feinsilver, ‘La diplomacia médica cubana’.
32 Dr. Miriam Gran Álvarez, ‘Estructura de la BMC’, 1 February 2008, available from http://colaboracion.sld.cu.
33 ‘Report on Cuban healthcare professionals in Bolivia’, Periódico 26, 16 July
2008, available from http://www.periodico26.cu.
34 http://www.cubacoop.com.
35 Prensa Latina, 4 August 2008.
36 Interviews with Doctors Félix Rigoli and Eduardo Guerrero, PAHO, Washington, 30 April 2009; UVS website http://www.uvirtual.sld.cu; Steve Brouwer, ‘Fidel’s WMDs versus Bush’s WMDs: World medical doctors are more powerful than weapons of mass destruction’, 14 November 2008 and ‘WMDs – World Medical Doctors – now being produced in Venezuela’, 13 November 2008, both posted to the blog site, Venezuela Notes, and available at http://www.venezuelanotes.blogspot.com; and ‘Cuba: More Doctors for the World’, MEDICC Review, 14 April 2008, available from http://www.medicc.org.
37 Personal communication from Saul Landau, whose daughter was one of those who passed the FMG in the US, 8 May 2009.
38 Data on medical graduates from a personal communication from Dr. Francisco Rojas Ochoa, Distinguished Professor and Editor of Revista cubana de salud pública, February 3, 2010; and Prensa Latina, 11 April 2008.
39 Embassy of India (Havana), ‘Annual Commercial & Economic Report-2006’, No.Hav/Comm/2007, 13 April 2007.
40 Carmelo Mesa-Lago, ‘The Cuban economy in 2008-2009: Internal and external challenges, state of the reforms and perspectives’, International Seminar on Cuba, Tulane University and Centro de Investigación y Adiestramiento Político Administrativo, San Jose, Costa Rica, 3-4 February 2009 (to be published in a book edited by Paolo Spadoni).
41 Interview with Dr. Félix Rigoli, PAHO, 30 April 2009.
42 Tal Abbady, ‘Hundreds of Cuban medical workers defecting to US while overseas’, South Florida Sun-Sentinel, 10 October 2007 (posted at http://www.coha.org).
43 Elise Andaya, ‘The Gift of health: Socialist medical practice and shifting material and moral economies in post-Soviet Cuba’, Medical Anthropology Quarterly (2009).
44 Ibid. and Pierre Sean Brotherton, ‘We have to think like capitalists but continue being socialists: Medicalized subjectivities, emergent capital, and socialist entrepreneurs in post-Soviet Cuba’, American Ethnologist, 35(2), May 2008.
45 Abbady, ‘Hundreds of Cuban medical workers defecting’.
46 The nature of the activity of defection makes valid estimates difficult. Neither Homeland Security nor the State Department’s Cuba Desk would provide any information and said that they did not have that data. Abbady cites Rep. Lincoln Diaz-Balart’s office indicating that 1,000 Cuban doctors have come to the US under a special program announced in 2006.
47 US Department of Homeland Security, US Customs and Immigration Services, ‘Fact Sheet: Parole for Cuban Medical Personnel in Third Countries’, 19 September 2006.
48 Mike Ceasar, ‘Cuban doctors abroad helped to defect by new us visa policy’, World Politics Review, 1 August 2007.
49 Oficina Nacional de Estadisticas, Anuario Estadistico 2008 (Edición 2009), Table
19.21.
50 Ibid., Table 19.4.
51 On the disparity between rhetoric and practice and the nature of doctor-patient relations in the Cuban health system, see Pierre Sean Brotherton, ‘Macroeconomic change and the biopolitics of health in Cuba’s special period’, Journal of Latin American Anthropology, 10(2), 2005; Brotherton, ‘We have to think like capitalists’; and Elise Andaya, ‘The gift of health’.
52 María Isabel Domínguez, ‘Cuban social policy: principal spheres and targeted social groups’, Latin American Perspectives, 36(2), March 2009.
53 Feinsilver, ‘Médicos por petroleo [Oil-for-Doctors]’.
2 Ibid., pp. 37-40.
3 Médicos de la familia y cobertura según provincias, Anuario Estadístico de Salud 2007, Fuente: Registro de profesionales de la salud y Dirección de Atención Primaria, 2007, http://bvs.sld.cu and Oficina Nacional de Estadisticas, Anuario Estadística 2008 (Edición 2009), Tables 19.1, 19.4 and 19.5 Coverage was reorganized in late 2007. There were 932 fewer family doctors in 2008 than 2006, which could be due to a number of factors such as natural attrition, further specialization, system rationalization or defection while abroad.
4 Feinsilver, Healing the Masses, pp. 117-18.
5 Ibid., pp. 40-41, 44-47.
6 Ibid., pp. 58-62, 122-55.
7 ‘La Reforma Del Sector de la Salud’, available from http://www.dne.sld.cu.
8 Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), Health in the Americas 2007, Washington: PAHO, 2007, available from http://www.paho.org.
9 Ibid.
10 Table 87, ‘Ejecución del presupuesto y gasto por habitante 1959, 1960, 1965, 1970 – 2006’, Año anuario 2006, Fuente: Registros administrativos de la Dirección Nacional de Finanzas y Contabilidad.
11 República de Cuba, Dirección Nacional de Estadística del Ministerio de Salud Pública, Sistema Nacional de Salud Políticas, Estrategias y Programas. Havana, Cuba, December 1998. ‘La Reforma Del Sector de la Salud’.
12 PAHO, Health Situation in the Americas. Basic Indicators 2007, p. 4.
13 Republica de Cuba, Ministerio de Salud Pública, Proyecciones de la Salud Pública en Cuba para el 2015, Havana: Editorial Ciencias Médicas, February 2006, p. 64.
14 Abelardo Ramírez Márquez and Cándido López Pardo, ‘A Monitoring System for Health Equity in Cuba’, MEDICC Review, 7(9), Nov/Dec 2005, available from http://ww.medicc.org.
15 Ministerio de Salud Pública, Proyecciones.
16 Republica de Cuba, Oficina Nacional de Estadísticas, Anuario Estadístico de Cuba 2008 (Edición 2009), available from http://www.one.cu/aec2008/esp/20080618_tabla_cuadro.htm.
17 Feinsilver, Healing the Masses, Chapter 6, ‘Cuban Medical Diplomacy’ (on comparison with the former Soviet bloc and China, see pp. 159-160).
18 Interview with Carlos Lovo, Advisor to the Salvadoran Minister of Health at that time, Washington, 30 April 2009.
19 Cuban Cooperation, Website of the Cuban Governmental Cooperation in the Health Sector, http://www.cubacoop.com (available in Spanish and English); and ‘Cubans to help boost local health sector’, Jamaica Observer, 10 May 2008.
20 Feinsilver, Healing The Masses, Chapter 6.
21 ‘Cuban medical cooperation in South Africa highlighted’, Cuba Direct (online),
26 May 2009, available from http://emba.cubaminrex.cu.
22 http://www.cubacoop.com.
23 Prensa Latina, 11 April 2008.
24 http://www.cubacoop.com.
25 AFP, ‘Massive UN vote in support of lifting US embargo on Cuba’, 29 October
30 2008.
26 http://www.cubacoop.com.
27 Ibid.
28 Aleksei Aleksandrov, ‘Health care: The secrets of Cuban medicine’, Argumenty i Fakty (mass-circulation weekly), Moscow, 17 September 2003, reprinted in World Press Review, 50(12), 2003; and ‘Over 20,000 children from Chernobyl rehabilitated in Cuba,’ Caribbean Net News, 2 April 2009, available from http://www.caribbeannetnews.com.
29 Feinsilver, ‘La diplomacia médica cubana: cuando la izquierda lo ha hecho bien
[Cuban medical diplomacy: When the left has got it right]’, Foreign Affairs en
Español, 6(4), 2006, pp. 81-94. The English version is available from http://
www.coha.org.
30 Feinsilver, ‘Cuba as a world medical power: the politics of symbolism’, Latin American Research Review, 24(2), 1989, p. 1; and Healing the Masses.
31 Feinsilver, ‘Médicos por petroleo: la diplomacia médica cubana recibe apoyo de sus amigos [Oil-for-Doctors: Cuban medical diplomacy gets a little help from a Venezuelan friend]’, Nueva Sociedad, 216(July-August), 2008, available in both English and Spanish from http://www.nuso.org; and Feinsilver, ‘La diplomacia médica cubana’.
32 Dr. Miriam Gran Álvarez, ‘Estructura de la BMC’, 1 February 2008, available from http://colaboracion.sld.cu.
33 ‘Report on Cuban healthcare professionals in Bolivia’, Periódico 26, 16 July
2008, available from http://www.periodico26.cu.
34 http://www.cubacoop.com.
35 Prensa Latina, 4 August 2008.
36 Interviews with Doctors Félix Rigoli and Eduardo Guerrero, PAHO, Washington, 30 April 2009; UVS website http://www.uvirtual.sld.cu; Steve Brouwer, ‘Fidel’s WMDs versus Bush’s WMDs: World medical doctors are more powerful than weapons of mass destruction’, 14 November 2008 and ‘WMDs – World Medical Doctors – now being produced in Venezuela’, 13 November 2008, both posted to the blog site, Venezuela Notes, and available at http://www.venezuelanotes.blogspot.com; and ‘Cuba: More Doctors for the World’, MEDICC Review, 14 April 2008, available from http://www.medicc.org.
37 Personal communication from Saul Landau, whose daughter was one of those who passed the FMG in the US, 8 May 2009.
38 Data on medical graduates from a personal communication from Dr. Francisco Rojas Ochoa, Distinguished Professor and Editor of Revista cubana de salud pública, February 3, 2010; and Prensa Latina, 11 April 2008.
39 Embassy of India (Havana), ‘Annual Commercial & Economic Report-2006’, No.Hav/Comm/2007, 13 April 2007.
40 Carmelo Mesa-Lago, ‘The Cuban economy in 2008-2009: Internal and external challenges, state of the reforms and perspectives’, International Seminar on Cuba, Tulane University and Centro de Investigación y Adiestramiento Político Administrativo, San Jose, Costa Rica, 3-4 February 2009 (to be published in a book edited by Paolo Spadoni).
41 Interview with Dr. Félix Rigoli, PAHO, 30 April 2009.
42 Tal Abbady, ‘Hundreds of Cuban medical workers defecting to US while overseas’, South Florida Sun-Sentinel, 10 October 2007 (posted at http://www.coha.org).
43 Elise Andaya, ‘The Gift of health: Socialist medical practice and shifting material and moral economies in post-Soviet Cuba’, Medical Anthropology Quarterly (2009).
44 Ibid. and Pierre Sean Brotherton, ‘We have to think like capitalists but continue being socialists: Medicalized subjectivities, emergent capital, and socialist entrepreneurs in post-Soviet Cuba’, American Ethnologist, 35(2), May 2008.
45 Abbady, ‘Hundreds of Cuban medical workers defecting’.
46 The nature of the activity of defection makes valid estimates difficult. Neither Homeland Security nor the State Department’s Cuba Desk would provide any information and said that they did not have that data. Abbady cites Rep. Lincoln Diaz-Balart’s office indicating that 1,000 Cuban doctors have come to the US under a special program announced in 2006.
47 US Department of Homeland Security, US Customs and Immigration Services, ‘Fact Sheet: Parole for Cuban Medical Personnel in Third Countries’, 19 September 2006.
48 Mike Ceasar, ‘Cuban doctors abroad helped to defect by new us visa policy’, World Politics Review, 1 August 2007.
49 Oficina Nacional de Estadisticas, Anuario Estadistico 2008 (Edición 2009), Table
19.21.
50 Ibid., Table 19.4.
51 On the disparity between rhetoric and practice and the nature of doctor-patient relations in the Cuban health system, see Pierre Sean Brotherton, ‘Macroeconomic change and the biopolitics of health in Cuba’s special period’, Journal of Latin American Anthropology, 10(2), 2005; Brotherton, ‘We have to think like capitalists’; and Elise Andaya, ‘The gift of health’.
52 María Isabel Domínguez, ‘Cuban social policy: principal spheres and targeted social groups’, Latin American Perspectives, 36(2), March 2009.
53 Feinsilver, ‘Médicos por petroleo [Oil-for-Doctors]’.
Friday, February 26, 2010
References: Climate Migration in Latin America: A Future ‘Flood of Refugees’ to the North? Part 2
1Warner, Koko, et al. In Search of Shelter: Mapping the Effects of Climate Change on Human Migration and Displacement. New York: UN University, CARE International, Columbia University, the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), World Bank, 7, 2009.
2 Renaud, Fabrice, et al. "Control, Adapt Or Flee: How to Face Environmental Migration?" InterSectTions, 'Interdisciplinary Security ConnecTions' Publication Series of UNU-EHS, 19 (2007) . 07/25/09.
3 Environmental Change and Forced Migration Scenarios Project (EACH-FOR). Preliminary Findings from the EACH-FOR Project on Environmentally Induced Migration. Environmental Change and Forced Migration Scenarios Project, 28, 2008. 07/25/09.
4 Warner, et al, 7
5 Warner, et al, 7
6 Warner, et al, 7
7 International Organization for Migration, Vol. 31. Geneva, Switzerland: International Organization for Migration, 32, 2008b. 07/25/09.
8 International Organization for Migration, Migration and Climate Change, 32
9 Tina Acketoft, Environmentally Induced Migration and Displacement: a 21st Century Challenge (Strasbourg, France: Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 2008) 11.
10United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT), Global Report on Human Settlements 2007: Enhancing Urban Safety and Security (Nairobi, Kenya: United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT), 2007) 121, 09/12/09.
11 Acketoft, 11
12 Lisa Boscov-Ellen, "Out of Sight, Out of Mind: Rio's Slum Solution," Council on Hemispheric Affairs September 3rd, 2009, : 09/05/09.
13 Acketoft, 10
14 Warner, et al, 7
15 International Organization for Migration, Migration and Climate Change, 32-33
16 International Organization for Migration, Migration and Climate Change, 34
17 International Organization for Migration, Migration and Climate Change, 34
18 International Organization for Migration, Migration and Climate Change, 34
19 International Organization for Migration, Migration and Climate Change, 34-35
20 Brown, O., Migration and Climate Change, International Organization for Migration, IOM Migration Research Series, (N° 31, Geneva, 2008), 34-35 cited in Tina Acketoft, Environmentally Induced Migration and Displacement: a 21st Century Challenge (Strasbourg, France: Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 2008) 11.
21 Paulina de los Reyes, "Women and Migrants: Continuity and Change in Patterns of Female Migration in Latin America," Women, Gender, and Labour Migration, ed. Pamela Sharpe, first ed. (Oxon, UK: Routledge, 2001) 275-282,.
22 de los Reyes, 282
23 Boano, Camillo, Roger Zetter, and Tim Morris. Environmentally Displaced People: Understanding the Linkages between Environmental Change, Livelihoods and Forced Migration. Ed. Simon Addison. Vol. 1. Oxford: Refugee Studies Centre, Oxford University, 20, 2008. 07/25/09.
24 International Organization for Migration, Migration and Climate Change, 33
25 Boano, Zetter, and Morris, 20
26 Boano, Zetter, and Morris, 21-22
27 John M. Broder, "Climate Change Seen as Threat to U.S. Security," International Herald Tribune August 8 2009, , sec. Science: 08/08/09.
28 Gosine, Andil. "Roots of Flight: Environmental Refugees in Latin America -A Response to Analysis by Homer-Dixon." Refuge 15.2, 27 (1996): 27. . 07/25/09.
29 Boano, Zetter, and Morris, 24
30 Broder,
31 Robert M. Mcab and Kathleen S. Bailey, "Latin America and the Debate over Environmental Protection and National Security," DISAM Journal of International Security Assistance Managment (2007) 07/25/09.
32 International Organization for Migration, Migration and Climate Change, 37
33 Warner, et al, v
34 Boano, Zetter, and Morris, 28
35 International Organization for Migration, Migration and Climate Change, 10
36 Boano, Zetter, and Morris, 18
37 International Organization for Migration, Migration and Climate Change, 39
38 Millman, Joel, “U.S. Lets Illegal Haitians Stay, Will Turn Back Refugees,” The Wall Street Journal (2010); 01/16/10.
39 International Organization for Migration, Migration and Climate Change, 39
2 Renaud, Fabrice, et al. "Control, Adapt Or Flee: How to Face Environmental Migration?" InterSectTions, 'Interdisciplinary Security ConnecTions' Publication Series of UNU-EHS, 19 (2007) . 07/25/09
3 Environmental Change and Forced Migration Scenarios Project (EACH-FOR). Preliminary Findings from the EACH-FOR Project on Environmentally Induced Migration. Environmental Change and Forced Migration Scenarios Project, 28, 2008. 07/25/09
4 Warner, et al, 7
5 Warner, et al, 7
6 Warner, et al, 7
7 International Organization for Migration, Vol. 31. Geneva, Switzerland: International Organization for Migration, 32, 2008b. 07/25/09.
8 International Organization for Migration, Migration and Climate Change, 32
9 Tina Acketoft, Environmentally Induced Migration and Displacement: a 21st Century Challenge (Strasbourg, France: Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 2008) 11.
10United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT), Global Report on Human Settlements 2007: Enhancing Urban Safety and Security (Nairobi, Kenya: United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT), 2007) 121, 09/12/09
11 Acketoft, 11
12 Lisa Boscov-Ellen, "Out of Sight, Out of Mind: Rio's Slum Solution," Council on Hemispheric Affairs September 3rd, 2009, : 09/05/09
13 Acketoft, 10
14 Warner, et al, 7
15 International Organization for Migration, Migration and Climate Change, 32-33
16 International Organization for Migration, Migration and Climate Change, 34
17 International Organization for Migration, Migration and Climate Change, 34
18 International Organization for Migration, Migration and Climate Change, 34
19 International Organization for Migration, Migration and Climate Change, 34-35
20 Brown, O., Migration and Climate Change, International Organization for Migration, IOM Migration Research Series, (N° 31, Geneva, 2008), 34-35 cited in Tina Acketoft, Environmentally Induced Migration and Displacement: a 21st Century Challenge (Strasbourg, France: Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 2008) 11.
21 Paulina de los Reyes, "Women and Migrants: Continuity and Change in Patterns of Female Migration in Latin America," Women, Gender, and Labour Migration, ed. Pamela Sharpe, first ed. (Oxon, UK: Routledge, 2001) 275-282,
22 de los Reyes, 282
23 Boano, Camillo, Roger Zetter, and Tim Morris. Environmentally Displaced People: Understanding the Linkages between Environmental Change, Livelihoods and Forced Migration. Ed. Simon Addison. Vol. 1. Oxford: Refugee Studies Centre, Oxford University, 20, 2008. 07/25/09
24 International Organization for Migration, Migration and Climate Change, 33
25 Boano, Zetter, and Morris, 20
26 Boano, Zetter, and Morris, 21-22
27 John M. Broder, "Climate Change Seen as Threat to U.S. Security," International Herald Tribune August 8 2009, , sec. Science: 08/08/09
28 Gosine, Andil. "Roots of Flight: Environmental Refugees in Latin America -A Response to Analysis by Homer-Dixon." Refuge 15.2, 27 (1996): 27. . 07/25/09
29 Boano, Zetter, and Morris, 24
30 Broder,
31 Robert M. Mcab and Kathleen S. Bailey, "Latin America and the Debate over Environmental Protection and National Security," DISAM Journal of International Security Assistance Managment (2007) 07/25/09
32 International Organization for Migration, Migration and Climate Change, 37
33 Warner, et al, v
34 Boano, Zetter, and Morris, 28
35 International Organization for Migration, Migration and Climate Change, 10
36 Boano, Zetter, and Morris, 18
37 International Organization for Migration, Migration and Climate Change, 39
38 Millman, Joel, “U.S. Lets Illegal Haitians Stay, Will Turn Back Refugees,” The Wall Street Journal (2010); 01/16/10
39 International Organization for Migration, Migration and Climate Change, 39
Thursday, February 25, 2010
The Yanomami: Malaria, Genocide and Policy Prospects
Bibliography
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Albert, Bruce and Francois-Michel Le-Tourneau. “Homoxi: Ruée Vers l’or ches les Indiens Yanomami du Haut Rio Mucajaí (Brésil).” Autrepart 34 (2005): 3-28. Print.
Bull, Peter and Kevin Marsh, “The Role of Antibodies to Plasmodium Falciparum-infected Erythrocyte Surface Antigens in Naturally Acquired Immunity to Malaria.” Trends in Microbiology 10 (2002): 55-58. Print.
Baird, J. Kevin et al. “Evidence for Specific Suppression of Gametocytemia by Plasmodium Falciparum in Residents of Hyperendemic Irian Jaya.” American Journal of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene 44 (1991): 183-190. Print.
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Friday, February 19, 2010
References: Climate Migration in Latin America: A Future ‘Flood of Refugees’ to the North? (Part 1)
1 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report, 2007) 53, 08/26/09 .
2 Christian Aid Human Tide: the Real Migration Crisis (2007)
www.christianaid.org.uk/Images/human_tide3__tcm15-23335.pdf, as cited in Camillo Boano, Roger Zetter, and Tim Morris, Environmentally Displaced People: Understanding the Linkages between Environmental Change, Livelihoods and Forced Migration, ed. Simon Addison (Oxford: Refugee Studies Centre, Oxford University, 2008) 12, 07/25/09.
3 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC),
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9 International Organization for Migration, Migration and Climate Change, 7
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1 Boano, Zetter, and Morris, 5
12 Alexandra Deprez, Conversation with Hiroyuki Tanaka, Research Assistant at the Migration Policy Institute, 2009
13 Odedra Kolmannskog and Vikram
14 Deprez, Conversation
15 Such as those inhabitants of the low-lying Pacific Islands.
16 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) A critical time for the environment. (2002, no.127), 2, in Renaud, et al, 19
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48 Boscov-Ellen, Lisa. “Water for Sale,” Council on Hemispheric Affairs (2009), .
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50 Boano, Zetter, and Morris, 15
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52 Telegraph, “Haiti earthquake: death toll reaches 200,000.” Telegraph; 02/04/2010.
53 Renois, Clarens, “Haitians angry over slow aid,” The Age; 02/05/2009..
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55 Warner, et al, 7
56 Boano, Zetter, and Morris, 11
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62 Gosine, 27
2 Christian Aid Human Tide: the Real Migration Crisis (2007)
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3 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC),
4 International Organization for Migration, Migration and Climate Change (Geneva, Switzerland: International Organization for Migration, 2008), 07/25/09
5 Fabrice Renaud, et al, "Control, Adapt or Flee: How to Face Environmental Migration?" InterSectTions, 'Interdisciplinary Security ConnecTions' Publication Series of UNU-EHS.5 (2007) 07/25/09
6 Koko Warner, et al, In Search of Shelter: Mapping the Effects of Climate Change on Human Migration and Displacement (New York: UN University, CARE International, Columbia University, the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), World Bank, 2009) 21.
7 Environmental Change and Forced Migration Scenarios Project (EACH-FOR), Preliminary Findings from the EACH-FOR project on Environmentally Induced Migration Environmental Change and Forced Migration Scenarios Project, 2008) 3, 07/25/09
8 Odedra Kolmannskog and Vikram, Future Floods of Refugees: A comment on climate change, conflict and forced migration, ed. Odedra Kolmannskog and Vikram (Oslo, Norway: Norwegian Refugee Council, 2008) 8, 07/25/09
9 International Organization for Migration, Migration and Climate Change, 7
10 Boano, Camillo, Roger Zetter, and Tim Morris. Environmentally Displaced People: Understanding the Linkages between Environmental Change, Livelihoods and Forced Migration. Ed. Simon Addison. Vol. 1. Oxford: Refugee Studies Centre, Oxford University, (2008),7 07/25/09
1 Boano, Zetter, and Morris, 5
12 Alexandra Deprez, Conversation with Hiroyuki Tanaka, Research Assistant at the Migration Policy Institute, 2009
13 Odedra Kolmannskog and Vikram
14 Deprez, Conversation
15 Such as those inhabitants of the low-lying Pacific Islands.
16 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) A critical time for the environment. (2002, no.127), 2, in Renaud, et al, 19
17 The UN agency does not appear to provide more specific and yearly data on the figure of individuals throughout the world displaced by natural disasters; at least attested by the lack of inclusion of pertaining data in their report 2008 Global Trends: Refugees, Asylum-Seekers, Returnees, Internally Displaced and Stateless People. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 02/01/10, http://www.unhcr.org/4a375c426.html.
18 International Organization for Migration, Migration and Climate Change, 31
19 Odedra Kolmannskog and Vikram, 9
20 Boano, Zetter, and Morris, 10
21 International Organization for Migration, Migration, Development and Environment,14
22 Boano, Zetter, and Morris, 10
23 Boano, Zetter, and Morris, 8
24 Boano, Zetter, and Morris, 13
25 International Organization for Migration, Migration and Climate Change, 36
26 Castles, S. Environmental change and forced migration: making sense of the debate,
UNHCR Issues in Refugee Research, (2002 Working Paper No. 70)
www.unhcr.org/research/RESEARCH/3de344fd9.pdf, as cited in Boano, Zetter, and Morris, 9
27 Deprez, Conversation.
28 Khalid Koser, International Migration: A Very Short Introduction (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007) 58-59.
29 International Organization for Migration, Migration and Climate Change, 25
30 International Organization for Migration, Migration and Climate Change, 24
31 Boano, Zetter, and Morris, 18
32 International Organization for Migration, Methodologies
33 Boano, Zetter, and Morris, 13
34 International Organization for Migration, Migration and Climate Change, 31
35 Sabine L. Perch-Nielsen, Michele B. Battig, and Dieter Imboden, "Exploring the Link Between Climate Change and Migration," Climatic Change.91 (2008) 07/25/09
36 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, Living Beyond Our Means. Natural Assets and Human Well-being: Synthesis from the Board. (2005) http://www.millenniumassessment.org/en/products.aspx, as cited in Renaud, et al, 24
37 Warner, et al, 7
38 Renaud, et al, 19
39 Janos J. Bogardi, International Dialogue on Migration: Expert Seminar: Migration and the Environment (Geneva, Switzerland: Migration Policy, Research and Communications Department (MPRC) of the International Organization for Migration, 2008) 81-82, 07/25/09
40 Perch-Nielsen, Battig, and Imboden, 388
41 Daussy, Laure. “Le casse-tête du statut des futures réfugiés climatiques,” Le Figaro.fr, (12/04/2009),
42 Boano, Zetter, and Morris, 15
43 Stern, N., (Ed.), The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review, (2006, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge), 56, as cited in International Organization for Migration, Migration and Climate Change, 31
44 Environmental Change and Forced Migration Scenarios Project (EACH-FOR), 26
45 Environmental Change and Forced Migration Scenarios Project (EACH-FOR), 25
46 Warner, et al, 5
47 Environmental Change and Forced Migration Scenarios Project (EACH-FOR), 24-25
48 Boscov-Ellen, Lisa. “Water for Sale,” Council on Hemispheric Affairs (2009),
49 International Organization for Migration, Migration, Development and Environment (Geneva, Switzerland: International Organization for Migration, 2008) 22, 07/25/09
50 Boano, Zetter, and Morris, 15
51 Alexandra Deprez, "Earthquake Exposes Fault Lines in Costa Rican Governance," Council on Hemispheric Affairs (2009),
52 Telegraph, “Haiti earthquake: death toll reaches 200,000.” Telegraph; 02/04/2010
53 Renois, Clarens, “Haitians angry over slow aid,” The Age; 02/05/2009.
54 Natasha Gilbert, "Hurricane peak not unique," Nature News August 12, 2009, : 09/11/09
55 Warner, et al, 7
56 Boano, Zetter, and Morris, 11
57 Warner, et al, 3
58 Renaud, et al, 22
59 Warner, et al, 3
60 Andil Gosine, "Roots of Flight: Environmental Refugees in Latin America -A Response to Analysis by Homer-Dixon," Refuge 15.2 (1996) 07/25/09
61 United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT), Nicaragua Law, Land Tenure and Gender Review: Latin America (Nairobi, Kenya: United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT), 2005) 34, 09/11/09
62 Gosine, 27
Friday, December 18, 2009
Denise Stanley's Letter regarding the Abstention Rate Controversy in Honduras
Thanks so much for continuing to cover the events in Honduras! It has dropped out of the mainstream press, yet the problems remain. Many people in California remain outraged with the State Department's policy on this issue, and it is only through follow-up research that the true underlying problems in Honduras will be revealed.
As I mentioned in my earlier email I was always concerned about the survey results reported in the press about Zelaya having no support in Honduras. I remain convinced that a serious rural-urban split underlies Honduran politics and this has not been picked up in survey efforts or reporting. I hope that further analysis of the election results and absenteeism will be done.
Finally I did want to congratulate Michaela D'Ambrosio for her excellent piece on the economic backdrop to the coup and the subsequent effects. The populism model advocated by Zelaya clearly scared the Honduran elite, and apart from a few sentences in the LA Times I don't think the US press mentioned economics much. The country's future economic picture does not look bright as Michaela mentions. The Washington Post seemed to say that since remittances have continued to Honduras the country should be fine. But ECLAC just reported on Monday that Honduras will have the worst (negative) growth outcomes in all of Latin America in 2010.
Well since the postings on your blog have been so strident I just wanted to send this email to say thanks again for your work.
Cheers,
Denise Stanley, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Economics
California State University-Fullerton
We thank Dr. Stanley for her observations and want to take this opportunity to proudly announce that she has just been appointed a COHA Senior Research Fellow.
Sincerely,
COHA Staff
As I mentioned in my earlier email I was always concerned about the survey results reported in the press about Zelaya having no support in Honduras. I remain convinced that a serious rural-urban split underlies Honduran politics and this has not been picked up in survey efforts or reporting. I hope that further analysis of the election results and absenteeism will be done.
Finally I did want to congratulate Michaela D'Ambrosio for her excellent piece on the economic backdrop to the coup and the subsequent effects. The populism model advocated by Zelaya clearly scared the Honduran elite, and apart from a few sentences in the LA Times I don't think the US press mentioned economics much. The country's future economic picture does not look bright as Michaela mentions. The Washington Post seemed to say that since remittances have continued to Honduras the country should be fine. But ECLAC just reported on Monday that Honduras will have the worst (negative) growth outcomes in all of Latin America in 2010.
Well since the postings on your blog have been so strident I just wanted to send this email to say thanks again for your work.
Cheers,
Denise Stanley, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Economics
California State University-Fullerton
We thank Dr. Stanley for her observations and want to take this opportunity to proudly announce that she has just been appointed a COHA Senior Research Fellow.
Sincerely,
COHA Staff
Friday, December 11, 2009
Loveman Speaks
Con todo respeto, and after years of admiring COHA's efforts, the piece on Correa was not acceptable.
I do not admire "radical populism," whatever that means (to SOUTHCOM or Congress -- and Obama has no clue) just as I did not admire Peron or Ibanez or even Haya de la Torre. But basic historical accuracy is important for credibility over the long-term.
My suggestion, for what it is worth, is that before such opinion pieces go out over the web some more senior person review the work of younger colleagues. Or, without compromising COHA independence, maybe country specialist could take a look? Most of what you send out is not highly time sensitive. The Correa piece (though it really was not mostly about Correa) could have gone out a week or two weeks later without diminishing its timeliness. In the case of the Correa piece, almost anyone at FLACSO Ecuador (and especially Adrian Bonilla, the director) could have helped with the historical errors.
In my opinion, there is no sense compromising the efforts to change U.S. policy toward the region by allowing obvious errors to go out under/over COHA imprimatur. I realize that you have already begun to deal with the fallout of this particular piece, but my concern is about longer-term credibility and also the internal vetting of such pieces which, once released, are not only read by the old selective audiences of professional journals and remain on the web as for a long time. The political implications of shotgun "research" may have longer-term consequences.
Saludos Cordiales,
Brian Loveman
I do not admire "radical populism," whatever that means (to SOUTHCOM or Congress -- and Obama has no clue) just as I did not admire Peron or Ibanez or even Haya de la Torre. But basic historical accuracy is important for credibility over the long-term.
My suggestion, for what it is worth, is that before such opinion pieces go out over the web some more senior person review the work of younger colleagues. Or, without compromising COHA independence, maybe country specialist could take a look? Most of what you send out is not highly time sensitive. The Correa piece (though it really was not mostly about Correa) could have gone out a week or two weeks later without diminishing its timeliness. In the case of the Correa piece, almost anyone at FLACSO Ecuador (and especially Adrian Bonilla, the director) could have helped with the historical errors.
In my opinion, there is no sense compromising the efforts to change U.S. policy toward the region by allowing obvious errors to go out under/over COHA imprimatur. I realize that you have already begun to deal with the fallout of this particular piece, but my concern is about longer-term credibility and also the internal vetting of such pieces which, once released, are not only read by the old selective audiences of professional journals and remain on the web as for a long time. The political implications of shotgun "research" may have longer-term consequences.
Saludos Cordiales,
Brian Loveman
COHA Bravely Follows the Leader
COHA,
It is a measure of COHA's moral cowardice and leftist bias that it grants Long's huffilly indignant letter its special distribution status. His enthusiasm for Latin America's self-impoverishing left wing revolution identifies him as a shill for increasing and centralizing governmental power. How many experiments of that sort must be observed before the failure of the model is finally acknowledged? It has been pointed out countlesss times, but here it is, again: the movement of millions of immigrants across the globe is from more heavily regulated economies to less heavily regulated ones. When the people vote with their feet, they vote for a smaller central government.Long's incidental defense of FARC seals the case against his standing as an honest critic. He hides behind an incomplete factoid, to wit, that a number of Latin American countries have not classified FARC as a terrorist organization, in order to legitimize that criminal gang. But one need not await the leadership of the Venezuelan government or its bought and paid-for lapdogs, the Argentine ruling family, to note that FARC has kidnapped and currently holds over seven hundred civilian hostages, that it is a drug dealer of considerable scale, and that the government against which it wars is the most honestly elected, broadly supported in South America. FARC is a terrorist organization; everyone knows it, even if not everyone has the courage to say it.My criticism is not aimed at Long; everyone knows what he is. I write to chastise COHA, which so slavishly kowtows to its ideological masters.
Bernard McElhone, Penseur Extraordinaire
It is a measure of COHA's moral cowardice and leftist bias that it grants Long's huffilly indignant letter its special distribution status. His enthusiasm for Latin America's self-impoverishing left wing revolution identifies him as a shill for increasing and centralizing governmental power. How many experiments of that sort must be observed before the failure of the model is finally acknowledged? It has been pointed out countlesss times, but here it is, again: the movement of millions of immigrants across the globe is from more heavily regulated economies to less heavily regulated ones. When the people vote with their feet, they vote for a smaller central government.Long's incidental defense of FARC seals the case against his standing as an honest critic. He hides behind an incomplete factoid, to wit, that a number of Latin American countries have not classified FARC as a terrorist organization, in order to legitimize that criminal gang. But one need not await the leadership of the Venezuelan government or its bought and paid-for lapdogs, the Argentine ruling family, to note that FARC has kidnapped and currently holds over seven hundred civilian hostages, that it is a drug dealer of considerable scale, and that the government against which it wars is the most honestly elected, broadly supported in South America. FARC is a terrorist organization; everyone knows it, even if not everyone has the courage to say it.My criticism is not aimed at Long; everyone knows what he is. I write to chastise COHA, which so slavishly kowtows to its ideological masters.
Bernard McElhone, Penseur Extraordinaire
Thursday, December 10, 2009
Ecuador's Flirtations with Democracy: Correa Does it Somewhat Differently
Ecuador Today: How Does Correa Do It?
Latin America is watching another of its popular presidents, Ecuador’s Rafael Correa, lead his country into the 21st century. The fact that he enjoys such high esteem among the population reflects a string of artful campaign strategies and a largely successful attempt to remove the political constraints to his strategic goals. Not alone in his ambition to grant himself unrestricted power, he joins the ranks of regional leaders like Hugo Chávez, who have embarked on a radical and nationalist leadership effort. Correa has pledged economic relief to the poor, renewed political sovereignty to the indigenous, and regional integration. However, in doing so, civil liberties have at times been treated as privileges rather than guaranteed rights. Correa may appeal to the masses, but after fears of haphazard attempts to experiment with democracy in Ecuador, the country lingers in a political limbo, with many unsure as to which direction it will ultimately go.
In comparison to a number of other Latin American countries, Ecuador boasts a relatively stable, mostly-tranquil history that has been free of Pinochet-like military dictatorships, Batista-like presidential coups, and Salvadoran-like civil wars. However, such comparative stability cannot hide the formidable obstacles that face Ecuador today. In the most recent Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), which rates countries on a ten-point scale (10 being the least corrupt) according to civilian perceptions, Ecuador received a low 2.2, denoting “rampant corruption.” Furthermore, in recent months under the rule of democratically-elected President Rafael Correa, Ecuador has been accused of harboring terrorists operating against Colombia, threatening to shut down the independent TV station Teleamazonas, and seizing oil fields owned by the Anglo-French company Perenco Corp. Whether or not these actions will directly effect the future of Ecuador’s democratic institutions remains to be seen; however, President Correa’s continuous drift to the left is sure to ignite significant instability, both domestically and in the Andean region.
Latin America is watching another of its popular presidents, Ecuador’s Rafael Correa, lead his country into the 21st century. The fact that he enjoys such high esteem among the population reflects a string of artful campaign strategies and a largely successful attempt to remove the political constraints to his strategic goals. Not alone in his ambition to grant himself unrestricted power, he joins the ranks of regional leaders like Hugo Chávez, who have embarked on a radical and nationalist leadership effort. Correa has pledged economic relief to the poor, renewed political sovereignty to the indigenous, and regional integration. However, in doing so, civil liberties have at times been treated as privileges rather than guaranteed rights. Correa may appeal to the masses, but after fears of haphazard attempts to experiment with democracy in Ecuador, the country lingers in a political limbo, with many unsure as to which direction it will ultimately go.
In comparison to a number of other Latin American countries, Ecuador boasts a relatively stable, mostly-tranquil history that has been free of Pinochet-like military dictatorships, Batista-like presidential coups, and Salvadoran-like civil wars. However, such comparative stability cannot hide the formidable obstacles that face Ecuador today. In the most recent Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), which rates countries on a ten-point scale (10 being the least corrupt) according to civilian perceptions, Ecuador received a low 2.2, denoting “rampant corruption.” Furthermore, in recent months under the rule of democratically-elected President Rafael Correa, Ecuador has been accused of harboring terrorists operating against Colombia, threatening to shut down the independent TV station Teleamazonas, and seizing oil fields owned by the Anglo-French company Perenco Corp. Whether or not these actions will directly effect the future of Ecuador’s democratic institutions remains to be seen; however, President Correa’s continuous drift to the left is sure to ignite significant instability, both domestically and in the Andean region.
Monday, November 23, 2009
Is Uribe Pro-stability or Merely Anti-Guerrilla?: Colombia Stays Soft on Paramilitaries
Though it hardly constitutes breaking news, Colombian newsweekly Semana’s interview with Luis Jorge Garay makes for sobering reading. Garay has a lot to say about the evolution of the “new” paramilitary armies in Colombia and their links to what he calls the Colombian “narco-state,” none of which is very comforting for American policymakers. Garay’s basic insight is that while the Uribe government has weakened the FARC and other left-wing guerrilla groups, new drug-trafficking paramilitary groups have emerged and infiltrated the Colombian state, particularly at the local and regional level. These paramilitaries keep a low profile, but they are quite busy extending their influence across Colombia and subverting the state to meet their ends. Trials for top paramilitary leaders aside, Uribe has done little to uproot the long-term threat paramilitary groups pose to governance, and instead appears willing to sanction tacit cooperation between government officials and the new narco-paramilitaries.
In the mean time, the killings and violations of human rights just keep happening. Much has been made of the murder of trade unionists in Colombia, but the real scandal is the overbearing persecution of journalists and other defenders of human rights by paramilitaries and the government institutions aligned with them. Consider the chilling remarks by Defense Minister Gabriel de Silva to assembled military officers on August 12th:
When a Defense Minister tells his military chiefs that they need have no fear of the justice system, it’s usually considered a Bad Thing. And when he goes on to label those who would have it otherwise “enemies of the fatherland,” donor governments generally start making for the exits as fast as diplomatically possible. Yet the U.S. government went on to certify Colombia's human rights record in September, paving the way for continued military aid to Colombia under Plan Colombia.
This explains a lot about the current uproar over the base agreement signed on October 30th. When the U.S. announces a policy to combat narco-trafficking in Colombia, you expect to see funds go to narco-trafficking operations. When most of the money instead funds the Colombian military, and when that military appears to sanction the narco-trafficking operations of new paramilitary groups, regional powers begin to distrust U.S. intentions. And when the U.S. announces a plan to expand its military presence in Colombia, and then admits that its stated objectives in doing so weren’t entirely true…well, you get a regional backlash.
It’s handy to have a friendly government willing to host bases in the region, sure, but it undermines any potential benefit when policymakers fail to take seriously the conditions for aid stipulated in Plan Colombia. A lot of the sturm und drang over the base agreement could have been avoided if the State Department had stuck to the letter of the law and shown it was serious about human rights in Colombia. Instead, we find ourselves in a regional diplomatic conflagration.
Extra Credit: On Saturday Venezuelan authorities reported capturing Magaly Janeth Moreno Vega, a Colombian ex-prosecutor who confessed to aiding paramilitaries and was convicted as an accomplice to murder several years ago, before she fled while on temporary parole. Further evidence of rampant paramilitarism, or Venezuelan showmanship? Your comments are appreciated.
Research Associate Robert Banick
Though it hardly constitutes breaking news, Colombian newsweekly Semana’s interview with Luis Jorge Garay makes for sobering reading. Garay has a lot to say about the evolution of the “new” paramilitary armies in Colombia and their links to what he calls the Colombian “narco-state,” none of which is very comforting for American policymakers. Garay’s basic insight is that while the Uribe government has weakened the FARC and other left-wing guerrilla groups, new drug-trafficking paramilitary groups have emerged and infiltrated the Colombian state, particularly at the local and regional level. These paramilitaries keep a low profile, but they are quite busy extending their influence across Colombia and subverting the state to meet their ends. Trials for top paramilitary leaders aside, Uribe has done little to uproot the long-term threat paramilitary groups pose to governance, and instead appears willing to sanction tacit cooperation between government officials and the new narco-paramilitaries.
In the mean time, the killings and violations of human rights just keep happening. Much has been made of the murder of trade unionists in Colombia, but the real scandal is the overbearing persecution of journalists and other defenders of human rights by paramilitaries and the government institutions aligned with them. Consider the chilling remarks by Defense Minister Gabriel de Silva to assembled military officers on August 12th:
“May a colonel not tremble, may he have no fear before the codes [of justice], may a general or a soldier not tremble in the face of a [human rights] complaint, may their will to fight not be stopped by a judicial action by the enemies of the fatherland.”
When a Defense Minister tells his military chiefs that they need have no fear of the justice system, it’s usually considered a Bad Thing. And when he goes on to label those who would have it otherwise “enemies of the fatherland,” donor governments generally start making for the exits as fast as diplomatically possible. Yet the U.S. government went on to certify Colombia's human rights record in September, paving the way for continued military aid to Colombia under Plan Colombia.
This explains a lot about the current uproar over the base agreement signed on October 30th. When the U.S. announces a policy to combat narco-trafficking in Colombia, you expect to see funds go to narco-trafficking operations. When most of the money instead funds the Colombian military, and when that military appears to sanction the narco-trafficking operations of new paramilitary groups, regional powers begin to distrust U.S. intentions. And when the U.S. announces a plan to expand its military presence in Colombia, and then admits that its stated objectives in doing so weren’t entirely true…well, you get a regional backlash.
It’s handy to have a friendly government willing to host bases in the region, sure, but it undermines any potential benefit when policymakers fail to take seriously the conditions for aid stipulated in Plan Colombia. A lot of the sturm und drang over the base agreement could have been avoided if the State Department had stuck to the letter of the law and shown it was serious about human rights in Colombia. Instead, we find ourselves in a regional diplomatic conflagration.
Extra Credit: On Saturday Venezuelan authorities reported capturing Magaly Janeth Moreno Vega, a Colombian ex-prosecutor who confessed to aiding paramilitaries and was convicted as an accomplice to murder several years ago, before she fled while on temporary parole. Further evidence of rampant paramilitarism, or Venezuelan showmanship? Your comments are appreciated.
Research Associate Robert Banick
Labels:
Base Agreement,
Colombia,
Narco,
Paramilitaries,
Uribe
Monday, November 02, 2009
'Fordlandia' by COHA Senior Research Fellow Greg Grandin
BOOK REVIEW: 'Fordlandia' by Greg Grandin
Greg Grandin is a COHA Senior Research Fellow and a former intern from the 1980's. He is also currently a Professor of History at New York University. Below is a review of his recent book, Fordlandia, by Tim Rutten of the LA Times
The fascinating story of Henry Ford's venture to build an American utopia in the Brazilian rain forest.
By Tim Rutten
LA Times
June 24, 2009
From the moment restive medieval scribes began to jot their own thoughts and feelings into the spaces alongside the texts and chronicles they'd been assigned to copy, much that's most fascinating about Western history has seemed, at first, simply marginalia.
Historian Greg Grandin has taken what heretofore seemed just such a marginal event -- Henry Ford's failed attempt to establish a gigantic agricultural industrial complex in the heart of Brazil's Amazon Basin -- and turned it into a fascinating historical narrative that illuminates the auto industry's contemporary crisis, the problems of globalization and the contradictions of contemporary consumerism. For all of that, this is not, however, history freighted with political pedantry. Grandin is one of a blessedly expanding group of gifted American historians who assume that whatever moral the story of the past may yield, it must be a story well told.
"Fordlandia: The Rise and Fall of Henry Ford's Forgotten Jungle City" is precisely that -- a genuinely readable history recounted with a novelist's sense of pace and an eye for character. It's a significant contribution to our understanding of ourselves and engrossingly enjoyable.
In 1927, Ford was America's richest man and (in most "respectable" circles) one of its most admired. He was also in a protean sense our first industrial celebrity, forerunner of figures like David Packard, Bill Gates or Steve Jobs, who would be celebrated for organizing transforming technologies. The assembly line obviously was Ford's greatest innovation and the affordable personal auto its great transforming product, but his ambitions hardly stopped there.
'A relentless system'
Social reformers who visited Ford's first auto plants were horrified by what they saw. The British journalist Julian Street called the Model T assembly line in Highland Park "a relentless system" producing "terrible efficiency. . . . Like a river and its tributaries." Ford saw other problems -- high absenteeism and worker turnover. Later that year, Grandin writes, "Ford made an announcement that sent seismic shocks across the globe. . . . [T]he Ford Motor Company would pay an incentive wage of $5 for an eight-hour day, nearly double the average industrial standard. The Wall Street Journal charged Henry Ford with class treason, with 'economic blunders if not crimes.' Yet his absentee and turnover rate plummeted and Ford was jolted into the ranks of the world's most admired men, 'an international symbol of the new industrialism.' "
Ford followed up the raise with a system of educational, health and other benefits and set up a vast network of spies and home visitors to ensure the new wages were spent on "a wholesome life" rather than on "gambling, drinking or whoring." Workers were prodded into spending on houses, washing machines, vacuum cleaners and, of course, Ford cars. The mogul and the cadre of farsighted executives around him "understood that high wages and decent benefits would do more than create a dependable and thus more productive workforce; they would also stabilize and stimulate demand for industrial products by turning workers into consumers."
Thus was born "Fordism," which many at the time embraced as a kind of "third way" between unrestrained capitalism and Marxism. Ford and his astonishingly -- indeed, tragically -- contradictory character stand at the center of "Fordlandia." Grandin has, in essence, given us a bracing new angle on this strange man's biography. He was a lifelong admirer of Emerson, firm in the "Transcendentalists' belief in human perfectibility," yet he instinctively distrusted every individual's choice but his own -- and more so, as the years went on. He was a pacifist and opponent of capital punishment who ultimately unleashed brutal thugs to terrorize his own workers. He so loathed the farm life of his boyhood that he thought cow's milk should be replaced by soy and wool by linen, but went around founding utopian communities that mixed farming and industry. He was a bitter, vulgar, lifelong anti-Semite.
Ford was, in other words, perhaps that greatest example of a peculiarly American type in which the line between crank and genius is so ephemeral as to be all but invisible. Grandin has said he was drawn to the story of Fordlandia because it "captures the essence of Ford, tying together all the many threads of his life."
By the late 1920s, Ford was feeling many kinds of pressure: Socially, America was closing in on him. The long boom was tottering toward the abyss of 1929; his various social experiments were increasingly rejected, including a plan that in many respects anticipated the Tennessee Valley Authority; at the same time, an Anglo-Dutch attempt to monopolize the production of rubber in Southeast Asia seemed to directly threaten Ford Motor's future.
Rubber plantations
The Southeast Asian plantations were founded with seeds stolen from the Brazilian rain forest, where rubber trees grew wild. Thus, Ford was persuaded to put up $125,000 to acquire 2.5 million acres along an Amazon tributary 500 miles from the Atlantic. There he envisioned a vast plantation in which carefully selected seedlings would be raised scientifically and the latex harvested by local workers under the supervision of American executives. Ford decreed the construction of a model upper Michigan/New England village complete with Cape Cod-style bungalows, a state-of-the-art hospital, company cafeterias, schools, a cinema with American films and -- believe it or not -- nightly square dancing, of which the mogul approved. The local workers, who previously had lived in a kind of debt peonage to their buyers, were to be paid American wages.
Good intentions notwithstanding, it was a disaster from the start. Ford was a supporter of Prohibition and insisted that his workers refrain from alcohol and smoking, which didn't fly with anybody in the rain forest. A floating red-light district soon emerged, and the company hospital did a brisk business treating venereal disease. Most of all, consumerism failed because there was nothing to buy. Ford compensated by opening subsidized shoe stores and ice cream parlors. Similarly, concentrating the rubber trees in plantations made them more prone to the pests indigenous to the rain forest. Production never amounted to much. In 1930, the most serious of a series of riots erupted with chants of "kill all the Americans" after a manager did away with cafeteria table service and made workers line up for alien brown rice and whole wheat bread, which Ford regarded as "healthy."
Ford never visited Fordlandia, but he poured money into it and another nearby village, perhaps imagining that projects his fellow Americans had rejected might come to fruition there. By the time Ford Motor sold Fordlandia back to the Brazilian government in 1945 for $244,200, the company had spent, in inflation-adjusted figures, roughly $1 billion on the project.
Greg Grandin is a COHA Senior Research Fellow and a former intern from the 1980's. He is also currently a Professor of History at New York University. Below is a review of his recent book, Fordlandia, by Tim Rutten of the LA Times
The fascinating story of Henry Ford's venture to build an American utopia in the Brazilian rain forest.
By Tim Rutten
LA Times
June 24, 2009
From the moment restive medieval scribes began to jot their own thoughts and feelings into the spaces alongside the texts and chronicles they'd been assigned to copy, much that's most fascinating about Western history has seemed, at first, simply marginalia.
Historian Greg Grandin has taken what heretofore seemed just such a marginal event -- Henry Ford's failed attempt to establish a gigantic agricultural industrial complex in the heart of Brazil's Amazon Basin -- and turned it into a fascinating historical narrative that illuminates the auto industry's contemporary crisis, the problems of globalization and the contradictions of contemporary consumerism. For all of that, this is not, however, history freighted with political pedantry. Grandin is one of a blessedly expanding group of gifted American historians who assume that whatever moral the story of the past may yield, it must be a story well told.
"Fordlandia: The Rise and Fall of Henry Ford's Forgotten Jungle City" is precisely that -- a genuinely readable history recounted with a novelist's sense of pace and an eye for character. It's a significant contribution to our understanding of ourselves and engrossingly enjoyable.
In 1927, Ford was America's richest man and (in most "respectable" circles) one of its most admired. He was also in a protean sense our first industrial celebrity, forerunner of figures like David Packard, Bill Gates or Steve Jobs, who would be celebrated for organizing transforming technologies. The assembly line obviously was Ford's greatest innovation and the affordable personal auto its great transforming product, but his ambitions hardly stopped there.
'A relentless system'
Social reformers who visited Ford's first auto plants were horrified by what they saw. The British journalist Julian Street called the Model T assembly line in Highland Park "a relentless system" producing "terrible efficiency. . . . Like a river and its tributaries." Ford saw other problems -- high absenteeism and worker turnover. Later that year, Grandin writes, "Ford made an announcement that sent seismic shocks across the globe. . . . [T]he Ford Motor Company would pay an incentive wage of $5 for an eight-hour day, nearly double the average industrial standard. The Wall Street Journal charged Henry Ford with class treason, with 'economic blunders if not crimes.' Yet his absentee and turnover rate plummeted and Ford was jolted into the ranks of the world's most admired men, 'an international symbol of the new industrialism.' "
Ford followed up the raise with a system of educational, health and other benefits and set up a vast network of spies and home visitors to ensure the new wages were spent on "a wholesome life" rather than on "gambling, drinking or whoring." Workers were prodded into spending on houses, washing machines, vacuum cleaners and, of course, Ford cars. The mogul and the cadre of farsighted executives around him "understood that high wages and decent benefits would do more than create a dependable and thus more productive workforce; they would also stabilize and stimulate demand for industrial products by turning workers into consumers."
Thus was born "Fordism," which many at the time embraced as a kind of "third way" between unrestrained capitalism and Marxism. Ford and his astonishingly -- indeed, tragically -- contradictory character stand at the center of "Fordlandia." Grandin has, in essence, given us a bracing new angle on this strange man's biography. He was a lifelong admirer of Emerson, firm in the "Transcendentalists' belief in human perfectibility," yet he instinctively distrusted every individual's choice but his own -- and more so, as the years went on. He was a pacifist and opponent of capital punishment who ultimately unleashed brutal thugs to terrorize his own workers. He so loathed the farm life of his boyhood that he thought cow's milk should be replaced by soy and wool by linen, but went around founding utopian communities that mixed farming and industry. He was a bitter, vulgar, lifelong anti-Semite.
Ford was, in other words, perhaps that greatest example of a peculiarly American type in which the line between crank and genius is so ephemeral as to be all but invisible. Grandin has said he was drawn to the story of Fordlandia because it "captures the essence of Ford, tying together all the many threads of his life."
By the late 1920s, Ford was feeling many kinds of pressure: Socially, America was closing in on him. The long boom was tottering toward the abyss of 1929; his various social experiments were increasingly rejected, including a plan that in many respects anticipated the Tennessee Valley Authority; at the same time, an Anglo-Dutch attempt to monopolize the production of rubber in Southeast Asia seemed to directly threaten Ford Motor's future.
Rubber plantations
The Southeast Asian plantations were founded with seeds stolen from the Brazilian rain forest, where rubber trees grew wild. Thus, Ford was persuaded to put up $125,000 to acquire 2.5 million acres along an Amazon tributary 500 miles from the Atlantic. There he envisioned a vast plantation in which carefully selected seedlings would be raised scientifically and the latex harvested by local workers under the supervision of American executives. Ford decreed the construction of a model upper Michigan/New England village complete with Cape Cod-style bungalows, a state-of-the-art hospital, company cafeterias, schools, a cinema with American films and -- believe it or not -- nightly square dancing, of which the mogul approved. The local workers, who previously had lived in a kind of debt peonage to their buyers, were to be paid American wages.
Good intentions notwithstanding, it was a disaster from the start. Ford was a supporter of Prohibition and insisted that his workers refrain from alcohol and smoking, which didn't fly with anybody in the rain forest. A floating red-light district soon emerged, and the company hospital did a brisk business treating venereal disease. Most of all, consumerism failed because there was nothing to buy. Ford compensated by opening subsidized shoe stores and ice cream parlors. Similarly, concentrating the rubber trees in plantations made them more prone to the pests indigenous to the rain forest. Production never amounted to much. In 1930, the most serious of a series of riots erupted with chants of "kill all the Americans" after a manager did away with cafeteria table service and made workers line up for alien brown rice and whole wheat bread, which Ford regarded as "healthy."
Ford never visited Fordlandia, but he poured money into it and another nearby village, perhaps imagining that projects his fellow Americans had rejected might come to fruition there. By the time Ford Motor sold Fordlandia back to the Brazilian government in 1945 for $244,200, the company had spent, in inflation-adjusted figures, roughly $1 billion on the project.
Friday, October 02, 2009
Honduras: Guaranteeing the elections
Paolo Luers, a commentator of El diario de Hoy of El Salvador sent us one of his articles regarding the current situation in Honduras. We would like to re-publish it in order to enhance the discussion regarding the current situation in Honduras and also to help identify and clarify different positions taken in the current debate.
The opinions expressed here correspond solely to the author and do not reflect the views of COHA.
The English synopsis of this article was prepared by COHA Research Associate Andres Ochoa
The opinions expressed here correspond solely to the author and do not reflect the views of COHA.
The English synopsis of this article was prepared by COHA Research Associate Andres Ochoa
Wednesday, September 23, 2009
Letter to the editor The Miami Herald "Let the Haitians Stay"
Read the original article here
Dear Editor,
Your editorial “Let the Haitians stay”, makes a strong case for the necessity to grant a protected status to the thousands of Haitians that have fled to the United States. Refusing to grant Temporary Protected Status (TPS) to Haitians has only furthered the long standing discrimination that they have been forced to face in the region, whether it be the systematic discrimination of citizenship rights for Haitian-Dominicans in the Dominican Republic, or the internationally overlooked upheaval following food shortages in 2008. Haitians, like past TPS groups, should be entitled to the same human dignity which international instruments and agreements seek to protect. By recognizing a protected status for the Haitians in the U.S., the calamities of their failed nation, Haiti, which has confronted unremitting natural and man-caused disasters, can be acknowledged. Furthermore, the promotion of human rights and international solidarity for a people who have been dealt a poor hand throughout their history would be clearly recorded. The U.S., as it seeks to champion human rights in the region, must take the critical first step by granting the Haitians greater dignity, which can only reward all concerned.
Andres Ochoa
Research Associate, Council on Hemispheric Affairs
Washington D.C.
Dear Editor,
Your editorial “Let the Haitians stay”, makes a strong case for the necessity to grant a protected status to the thousands of Haitians that have fled to the United States. Refusing to grant Temporary Protected Status (TPS) to Haitians has only furthered the long standing discrimination that they have been forced to face in the region, whether it be the systematic discrimination of citizenship rights for Haitian-Dominicans in the Dominican Republic, or the internationally overlooked upheaval following food shortages in 2008. Haitians, like past TPS groups, should be entitled to the same human dignity which international instruments and agreements seek to protect. By recognizing a protected status for the Haitians in the U.S., the calamities of their failed nation, Haiti, which has confronted unremitting natural and man-caused disasters, can be acknowledged. Furthermore, the promotion of human rights and international solidarity for a people who have been dealt a poor hand throughout their history would be clearly recorded. The U.S., as it seeks to champion human rights in the region, must take the critical first step by granting the Haitians greater dignity, which can only reward all concerned.
Andres Ochoa
Research Associate, Council on Hemispheric Affairs
Washington D.C.
Monday, September 21, 2009
Response to "Venezuela's Polarized Society Split by Another Issue"
Read the original article here
The latest polls show significant erosion in Chavez’ popular support. One problem he faces is his reliance on cash disbursements and other transfers to the population, which are based on high oil prices and a reasonably efficient oil industry. This, alas, isn’t what it used to be. Both oil prices and oil industry efficiency are down, and therefore the government is increasingly unable to disburse the cash. The problem is compounded because the rest of the economy is slowly dying as he continues nationalizing portions of the economy using a fairly adhoc method. As the cash flow ceases, the masses don’t support him the way they did, so it’s going to get very interesting in the next few years.
Comment by Braulio Perez
The latest polls show significant erosion in Chavez’ popular support. One problem he faces is his reliance on cash disbursements and other transfers to the population, which are based on high oil prices and a reasonably efficient oil industry. This, alas, isn’t what it used to be. Both oil prices and oil industry efficiency are down, and therefore the government is increasingly unable to disburse the cash. The problem is compounded because the rest of the economy is slowly dying as he continues nationalizing portions of the economy using a fairly adhoc method. As the cash flow ceases, the masses don’t support him the way they did, so it’s going to get very interesting in the next few years.
Comment by Braulio Perez
Response to "The Honduran Coup: Was it a Matter of Behind the Scenes Finagling?"
Read the original article here
Articles like this, in which critical links are based on “may” and “it is said” are what characterizes Fox News and other neocon publications. Sadly, it also means they carry little credibility.
Comment by Braulio Perez
Articles like this, in which critical links are based on “may” and “it is said” are what characterizes Fox News and other neocon publications. Sadly, it also means they carry little credibility.
Comment by Braulio Perez
Response to "What the Drug War Needs is a Debate"
Read the original article here
Adequate management of drugs requires a worldwide permanent dialoque. There is no permanent solution. And any balancing point will be dynamic. It is like pushing on water.
A string of treaties would be the best framework but is difficult to achieve. Second best is each country working towards a solution model of the same structure. The good news is that such model can be built to handle any type of drug.
At least some LA countries seem to be convinced now that one should not penalize drug consumers. This appears to be close to the Dutch “coffeeshop” model for drugs. By the way, the Dutch are top drugproducers, close to Colombia and Afghanistan. Further, one should not forget alcohol and tobacco. These produce heavier damage than the drugs we talk about here. But they are “accepted” to a certain degree. This shows the way to better management. Demand can only be reduced by information and education. Treatment of health damage can be financed by excise-duties.
Supply follows demand. So, it is not efficient to fight the problem in the production countries. The battle must be won in the consumer markets. We can manage it by making it a state monopoly. This will guarantee quality and control prices.
May be it would be even better to hand out licences to a limited number of private dealers. Their market behavior can be tightly controlled. It is even worthwhile to consider some of the large actual traders. Let them apply and pay for the licence. They are so rich and powerful that pushing them back will be very difficult and costly. Moreover, if we would succeed, they will shift their huge resources to other illegal activities like prostitution, armstrade and slavelabour. That will be the day! Thanks to God these criminals have a propensity to legalize their business if we allow it.
As for the remaining illegal traders, we must be merciless.
Even capital punishment may be involved.
Comment by Charles Janssen
Adequate management of drugs requires a worldwide permanent dialoque. There is no permanent solution. And any balancing point will be dynamic. It is like pushing on water.
A string of treaties would be the best framework but is difficult to achieve. Second best is each country working towards a solution model of the same structure. The good news is that such model can be built to handle any type of drug.
At least some LA countries seem to be convinced now that one should not penalize drug consumers. This appears to be close to the Dutch “coffeeshop” model for drugs. By the way, the Dutch are top drugproducers, close to Colombia and Afghanistan. Further, one should not forget alcohol and tobacco. These produce heavier damage than the drugs we talk about here. But they are “accepted” to a certain degree. This shows the way to better management. Demand can only be reduced by information and education. Treatment of health damage can be financed by excise-duties.
Supply follows demand. So, it is not efficient to fight the problem in the production countries. The battle must be won in the consumer markets. We can manage it by making it a state monopoly. This will guarantee quality and control prices.
May be it would be even better to hand out licences to a limited number of private dealers. Their market behavior can be tightly controlled. It is even worthwhile to consider some of the large actual traders. Let them apply and pay for the licence. They are so rich and powerful that pushing them back will be very difficult and costly. Moreover, if we would succeed, they will shift their huge resources to other illegal activities like prostitution, armstrade and slavelabour. That will be the day! Thanks to God these criminals have a propensity to legalize their business if we allow it.
As for the remaining illegal traders, we must be merciless.
Even capital punishment may be involved.
Comment by Charles Janssen
Response to "What the Drug War Needs is a Debate"
Read the original article here
Marijuana Legalization does not require ANY more debate. Polls are showing time and time again that the majority of Americans support legalizing pot. What we need is the Ability to prosecute out Representatives for KNOWINGLY disobeying the will of the people. A law like this would be Good to preserve OUR democracy from lobbyists and crooked politicians.
Comment by Todd
Marijuana Legalization does not require ANY more debate. Polls are showing time and time again that the majority of Americans support legalizing pot. What we need is the Ability to prosecute out Representatives for KNOWINGLY disobeying the will of the people. A law like this would be Good to preserve OUR democracy from lobbyists and crooked politicians.
Comment by Todd
Response to "What the Drug War Needs is a Debate"
Read the original article here
Debaters debate the two wars as if Nixon’s civil war on Woodstock Nation didn’t yet run amok. One need not travel to China to find indigenous cultures lacking human rights or to Cuba for political prisoners. America leads the world in percentile behind bars, thanks to ongoing persecution of hippies, radicals, and non-whites under banner of the war on drugs. If we’re all about spreading liberty abroad, then why mix the message at home? Peace on the home front would enhance global credibility.
The drug czar’s Rx for prison fodder costs dearly, as lives are flushed down expensive tubes. There’s trouble on the border. My shaman’s second opinion is that psychoactive plants are God’s gift. God didn’t screw up. Canadian Marc Emery sold seeds that enable American farmers to outcompete cartels with superior domestic herb. He is being extradited to prison, for doing what government wishes it could do, reduce demand for Mexican.
The constitutionality of the CSA (Controlled Substances Act of 1970) derives from an interstate commerce clause. Only by this authority does it reincarnate Al Capone, endanger homeland security, and throw good money after bad. Official policy is to eradicate, not tax, the number-one cash crop in the land. America rejected prohibition, but it’s back. Apparently, SWAT teams don’t need no stinking amendment. Father, forgive those who make it their business to know not what they do.
Nixon promised that the Schafer Commission would support the criminalization of his enemies, but it didn’t. No matter, the witch-hunt was on. No amendments can assure due process under an anti-science law without due process itself. Psychology hailed the breakthrough potential of LSD, until the CSA halted all research and pronounced that marijuana has no medical use, period.
The RFRA (Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993) allows Native American Church members to eat peyote, which functions like LSD. Americans shouldn’t need a specific church membership to obtain their birthright freedom of religion. Denial of entheogen sacrament to any American, for mediation of communion with his or her maker, precludes free exercise of religious liberty.
Freedom of speech presupposes freedom of thought. The Constitution doesn’t enumerate any governmental power to embargo diverse states of mind. How and when did government usurp this power to coerce conformity? The Mayflower sailed to escape coerced conformity. Legislators who would limit cognitive liberty lack jurisdiction.
Common-law must hold that adults are the legal owners of their own bodies. The Founding Fathers decreed that the right to the pursuit of happiness is inalienable. Socrates said to know your self. Mortal lawmakers should not presume to thwart the intelligent design that molecular keys unlock spiritual doors. Persons who appreciate their own free choice of path in life should tolerate seekers’ self-exploration.
Comment by Bill Harris
Debaters debate the two wars as if Nixon’s civil war on Woodstock Nation didn’t yet run amok. One need not travel to China to find indigenous cultures lacking human rights or to Cuba for political prisoners. America leads the world in percentile behind bars, thanks to ongoing persecution of hippies, radicals, and non-whites under banner of the war on drugs. If we’re all about spreading liberty abroad, then why mix the message at home? Peace on the home front would enhance global credibility.
The drug czar’s Rx for prison fodder costs dearly, as lives are flushed down expensive tubes. There’s trouble on the border. My shaman’s second opinion is that psychoactive plants are God’s gift. God didn’t screw up. Canadian Marc Emery sold seeds that enable American farmers to outcompete cartels with superior domestic herb. He is being extradited to prison, for doing what government wishes it could do, reduce demand for Mexican.
The constitutionality of the CSA (Controlled Substances Act of 1970) derives from an interstate commerce clause. Only by this authority does it reincarnate Al Capone, endanger homeland security, and throw good money after bad. Official policy is to eradicate, not tax, the number-one cash crop in the land. America rejected prohibition, but it’s back. Apparently, SWAT teams don’t need no stinking amendment. Father, forgive those who make it their business to know not what they do.
Nixon promised that the Schafer Commission would support the criminalization of his enemies, but it didn’t. No matter, the witch-hunt was on. No amendments can assure due process under an anti-science law without due process itself. Psychology hailed the breakthrough potential of LSD, until the CSA halted all research and pronounced that marijuana has no medical use, period.
The RFRA (Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993) allows Native American Church members to eat peyote, which functions like LSD. Americans shouldn’t need a specific church membership to obtain their birthright freedom of religion. Denial of entheogen sacrament to any American, for mediation of communion with his or her maker, precludes free exercise of religious liberty.
Freedom of speech presupposes freedom of thought. The Constitution doesn’t enumerate any governmental power to embargo diverse states of mind. How and when did government usurp this power to coerce conformity? The Mayflower sailed to escape coerced conformity. Legislators who would limit cognitive liberty lack jurisdiction.
Common-law must hold that adults are the legal owners of their own bodies. The Founding Fathers decreed that the right to the pursuit of happiness is inalienable. Socrates said to know your self. Mortal lawmakers should not presume to thwart the intelligent design that molecular keys unlock spiritual doors. Persons who appreciate their own free choice of path in life should tolerate seekers’ self-exploration.
Comment by Bill Harris
Response to "What the Drug War Needs is a Debate"
Read the original article here
The current focus of the drug war in the Americas must change. The existing direction, one held for the previous forty plus years has been ineffective and wasteful for all economies involved. While hundreds of billions of dollars have been dumped into this black hole of a policy, Hundreds of billions more are directed in profit towards gangs and cartels in every country. This improvident policy ignored all of the lessons of the prohibition of Alcohol in the United States during the period from 1920 to 1933. What the U.S. learned from their failed attempt at prohibiting their citizens’ access to a vice was the vice would multiply many times over previous levels. Second the emergence of gangs and organized crime syndicates would flourish and profit from filling the supply chain disrupted by laws and restrictions. This current policy does little more than create alternative methods for people to obtain their drugs. Without draconian measures, most in violation of the tenets of the United States Constitution, it will be impossible to eradicate drug use in this country.
In contrast a managed narcotic distribution program would supply the product to those who desire, tax revenue to those countries producing and selling, and withhold from the cartels the life blood of their crime families. It has taken well over six decades to weaken the stranglehold organized crime had over the political process of the U.S., and it will take several decades more to unseat the crime cartels of Latin America from their positions of political control, both within and outside of their countries. One quick method is to restrict their flow of hard currency. By legalizing possession, and licensing distribution and point of sale with methods currently used for the sale of alcohol, a system can quickly be put in place. One large requirement would be to ensure that the product has an equal profit distribution chain as well as providing medical support for those addicts who wish to end their addiction.
Too little thought has been given to the policies desired by the people of the Americas, and too much to the desires of those who profit from warfare and bloodshed. This isn’t a simple problem to fix, but dialogue on the subject is the best place to begin.
Comment by Mario Minichino
The current focus of the drug war in the Americas must change. The existing direction, one held for the previous forty plus years has been ineffective and wasteful for all economies involved. While hundreds of billions of dollars have been dumped into this black hole of a policy, Hundreds of billions more are directed in profit towards gangs and cartels in every country. This improvident policy ignored all of the lessons of the prohibition of Alcohol in the United States during the period from 1920 to 1933. What the U.S. learned from their failed attempt at prohibiting their citizens’ access to a vice was the vice would multiply many times over previous levels. Second the emergence of gangs and organized crime syndicates would flourish and profit from filling the supply chain disrupted by laws and restrictions. This current policy does little more than create alternative methods for people to obtain their drugs. Without draconian measures, most in violation of the tenets of the United States Constitution, it will be impossible to eradicate drug use in this country.
In contrast a managed narcotic distribution program would supply the product to those who desire, tax revenue to those countries producing and selling, and withhold from the cartels the life blood of their crime families. It has taken well over six decades to weaken the stranglehold organized crime had over the political process of the U.S., and it will take several decades more to unseat the crime cartels of Latin America from their positions of political control, both within and outside of their countries. One quick method is to restrict their flow of hard currency. By legalizing possession, and licensing distribution and point of sale with methods currently used for the sale of alcohol, a system can quickly be put in place. One large requirement would be to ensure that the product has an equal profit distribution chain as well as providing medical support for those addicts who wish to end their addiction.
Too little thought has been given to the policies desired by the people of the Americas, and too much to the desires of those who profit from warfare and bloodshed. This isn’t a simple problem to fix, but dialogue on the subject is the best place to begin.
Comment by Mario Minichino
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