Greetings Mr. Racheotes,
In response to your piece "Immigration Compromise, too little too late...." from July 26th, 2007, I would like to present to you some real questions that I believe truly reflect the will of the American People. I would like to preface w/the fact that I'm a 34 year old, African-American, from Kansas. I lived in Mexico City as an exchange student during my senior year in high school and loved my familia Mexicana so much that I returned on 3 different occasions to have 12-16 weeks 'live-in' visits with them. As a younger man, I witnessed first hand Mexico's foray into the global economy, NAFTA and to Mexico's present day GDP ranking 12th in the world according to the World Bank. I know as well, as you, that Mexico is not a poor country, but has a lot of her citizens who live in poverty, thus my email to you today. Poverty, my friend, is the greatest enemy of the people on both sides of the border and here is where my question's come in to you. In your article you outline the common political argument's and/or sound bytes, such as, American's losing job's, wages being depressed, the 'criminalization' of people who enter illegally, that 'nativists' or restrictionist are a recent phenomena, immigrant's don't assimilate, the environmental impact and the war on terror. I would like to present to you the following questions, because as an American, I often feel that the actual American people are not consulted in this as it seems only migrant's, first or second generation, their lobbyist or the politicians seem to be the only voices heard on the matter.
So, Mr. Racheotes, is it not true that that this is largely an issue between The United States and Mexico? Our proximity,history, present and our future is our commonality. Mexico, is by far the largest source of illegal immigration, because the masses from say Lithuania, Haiti or Guatemala, don't have the option of walking through the deserts, mountains or rivers to reach the promise land. Also doesn't Mexico have 47 consular offices throughout the U.S.? So, in my opinion, we should give Mexico what she's been begging for all along a 'special' agreement between the two lands allowing for the free flow of people, as well as goods and services between the two nations. However, this could only happen if we can get Mexico's people, her pro-immigration lobby and President Calderone on board with channeling of their energies into real change in their house FIRST!!! On a micro scale, you and I are neighbors and I'm living in modest house on a meager existence and you have much the same, except your existence isn't so meager and your house is 13 times the size of my house. Your family is large with 1/2 of them doing really well, but the other 1/2 struggling to survive on a daily basis and really they don't have anything. My family, while also large is doing quite well, with only about 10% living in poverty, but opportunity exists to affect change. Because I have more does not give you carte blanche access to my house to further yourself and your needs. It would only be proper for you to knock on the front door and await my permissions to enter. Correct? On a macro scale, The US has acted with impunity or imperialistically in her historic actions and yes, we did take land from Mexico 160 years ago, but we all have to come to terms with the our present. The US also allowed slavery until shortly after this war, a morally bankrupted policy, but it is our American History. So,my point is if Mexico feels that she needs her land back, that should have been addressed centuries ago. So, geopolitics has altered the landscape and the outlook of some of it's inhabitants, but we common American's see such much energy being focused on changing our government's policies, but see no effort's in Mexico City to change the outlook of her peoples, to stamp out corruption and the lack of transparency. It would be nice for the American people to know that there is just as much passion for change at home as well as here, but we do not see this. We see millions of Mexican flags waving in the streets, millions of Mexican dollars being spent on immigration lobbying (sustaining those remittances, no doubt), even branding their efforts as Ya! Ciuadana! Also, according the an email from sarajuanavir.sre.gob.mx, if I attempt to enter Mexico City without a passport, I will be detained, arrested and deported for violating the entry requirements for La Republica Mexicana. She also went on to detail that if I purchase a home in Mexico, I'm required to pay taxes on my property but am not allowed to work without the proper permissions of their government. Again, a violation of Mexican law, which is criminally punishable and a deportable offense. So, in short, it feels as if many Open Borders Advocacy groups want the very thing that even their home country will not permit. I know first hand that many citizens in and from Mexico cry racists because US immigration policy doesn't work in their favor, yet many Guatemalans and Cubans are picked up by Mexico's department of Immigration Control and guess what, detained and then shipped back to their home base. As an African-American, I've also witnessed the cultural racism that exists in Mexico towards the Indian populous and even the attitudes towards the children of Africa who've been scattered throughout the earth. Another question or actually concern of the average American, is the immigrants who want so desperately to cling to their national identity. It's rather unsettling to know that I live in an area where a large percentage of my 'neighbors' are really concerned about our great nation first and foremost. I understand dual loyalties or even divided, but when a people live in a place that they have no allegiance too, it's quite disturbing. Of course I know that a lot of what we are experiencing in these times has a lot to do with globalization. But, I believe the average everyday American would like our Southern neighbors to love their country more so and not be afraid to live there and to be enabled to thrive there, like Canada. Again, it's the ruling superclass on both sides of the Rio that are going to have an awful future to face if they continually ignore the plight of the people. But it is absolutely not fair for one to dump their poor on the other.
Best Regards,
Derrick Osborne
Our Forum is a shared community space that supplements the official COHA website. In this site we showcase the resources used in our articles. Feel free to explore our references and generate discussion.
Tuesday, April 29, 2008
Monday, April 07, 2008
Regarding "Macedonia: Reaching Out To Win Latin American Hearts and Minds"
Zlatko Kovach, in his Macedonia: Reaching Out To Win L. American Hearts, proves one more time that he is the product of the continuous brainwashing condition and lies, provided by an education system which emerged from a Balkan nation, under Tito’s and Stalin’s tutelage.
Mr. Kovach begins his elaborations, stating: “Macedonia historically and culturally did transcend the country's current borders. In 1912-13, through two brutal regional wars, Macedonia was forcefully partitioned among Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia. The Macedonians were subject to qualified genocide and many were driven from their land. It is this reality that Greece tirelessly tries to cover up.” Mr. Kovach fails to bring up that during the Ottoman era which lasted for five hundred years and ended in 1912 in that area, there was no use of the term Macedonia (meaning the boundaries of the geographic or ancient Macedonia). Ancient Macedonia was divided in two vilaets, the vilaet of Thessaloniki and the vilaet of Monastiri (Bitola). Skopje was the capital of the Kosovo vilaet and was never included in the so-called geographic Macedonia.
The author of this article is referring to the Slavic element that existed in Macedonia as part of a “Macedonian” nation whose people were wronged and “were subject to qualified genocide and many were driven from their land.” He however fails to explain why there was no “Macedonian ARMY” to fight for the rights of the supposed “ethnic Macedonians” during the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913. In addition during the negotiating talks of the Bucharest Treaty, which determined today’s borders with Greece’s neighbors, there were no representatives of any “Macedonian Nation”. The 1914 Carnegie Report (Report of the International Commission to Report on the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars) not only did not record the existence of a “Macedonian” army, but neither did it record the existence of any “ethnic Macedonian” civilians.
The Slavs did not arrive in the region until the sixth century AD. Until 1944, the area that is now legally referred to as the FYROM was called "Vardarska Banovina" until the Hellenic name of Macedonia was usurped by Marshall Broz Tito. According to Interim Accord (Sept. 13, 1995) and under the aegis of UN (UN Resolutions #817 of April 7 and #845 of June 18) of the year 1993, the temporary name until both countries, Greece and the aforementioned state, reach a permanent solution about this issue, is “the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, or simply The FYROM. The Interim Accord was signed by BOTH Greece and The FYROM, and its purpose was to find a name for the aforementioned country.
“…Greece labeled any use of Alexander the Great’s name by Macedonia as hostile propaganda…it was the Macedonian forces of Alexander the Great, led by his father King Philip II of Macedon, that beat the entire Greek army at Chaeronia in B.C. and conquered the modern Greeks’ ancestors,” writes Mr. Kovach. The author however, plunged into oblivion that the FYROM propaganda machination has provided for him, does not understand that his government’s actions over the years, such as distortions of geographic maps, revision of textbooks in their schoolbooks, renaming of their airport “Alexander the Great,” create hostility and animosity among their youth which is lacking knowledge to mainstream history. These actions and not Greece’s are the true threats to stability and have become the obstacle to their accession into EU and NATO.
The FYROM is a small country in the southern Balkans with very serious external and internal problems. It is the only country in Europe that succeeded in having open serious conflicts, with no prospect of resolution, with each of its four neighbors. Incredibly however, they have an entirely different type of conflict with each one of these neighbors.
In the north with Serbia who is a member State with The Partnership for Peace and an aspiring new NATO member, they have an open conflict with their schismatic illegal church, the so-called “Macedonian Orthodox Church” and this fact has angered their Serbian northern neighbor.
On the eastern side Bulgaria, a NATO member, does not recognize the so-called “Macedonians” as a distinct nation, nor a “Macedonian” language and accuses the FYROM of stealing its history. Amazingly enough The FYROM currently seems to have claims either linguistically or ethnologically to approximately 20% of the territory of this NATO ally of ours, Bulgaria.
On the west side the citizens of Albania clearly do not consider, and rightfully so, that 25% of the population of The FYROM should be called “Macedonians.” They consider them their Albanian brethren.
In the south they succeeded in angering Greece, and especially us, the true Macedonians, by using our identity and stealing our glorious history. After all Alexander the Great the Macedonian, spoke Greek, used the Hellenic alphabet, carried Homer’s works with him and spread the Hellenic language and civilization throughout the then known world. He did not speak the Bulgarian dialect that The FYROM people speak; he did not use the Cyrillic alphabet, which had not even appeared till about one thousand years after his death. Alexander the Great is our Abraham Lincoln, as he united the North and the South of the Hellenic World under Hellas.
Mr. Kovach seems to forget something very important. The Greek businesses that exist in his country right now have created over 30.000 jobs in FYROM’s depleted economy. Greece actually is helping its neighboring country to prosper economically and is guiding the FYROM on its way to EU and NATO, under one condition: the Slavs cannot be ethnically, linguistically or culturally Macedonians simply because they did not exist in this area until the 6th century AD, when they descended from Siberia and settled there. The Hellenic name Macedonia, which had always identified the northern area of Greece, preceded the introduction of the majority Slavic population of The FYROM in the Balkans by well over 2000 years. It is therefore of utmost importance that their nationality and language does not include the term “Macedonian.”
The author continuing the myth which he learned in the schooling he received, writes: “Greece is administratively divided into thirteen regions, three of which include the word Macedonia: "Region of Western Macedonia", "Region of Central Macedonia" and "Region of Eastern Macedonia and Thrace", but take notice that none of the regions are named simply "Macedonia." The liberation of present day Greece
from the Ottomans did not happen simultaneously in all former Greek territories, but it happened in different stages. In 1912-13, parts of Macedonia and Epirus were liberated. Since then Macedonia has been called as such. In fact, the first administrator in Thessaloniki in 1913 was called “Governor of Macedonia”. The term Northern Greece was ONLY for the Greek Ministry in Thessaloniki, because it included the region of Thrace as well. The Minister of this part of the Greek mainland is therefore called, the Minister of Macedonia and Thrace.
We agree that every country has the right to exist and find a proper name for itself, as long as no other ethnic group had previously rights to the same name. No German would allow a non-German ethnicity to call itself Bavarian. Therefore it is impossible for Greece to allow any non-Greek people identified as Macedonian, because the name implies Greek identity. The same would be true for Peloponnesus/Peloponnesians, Thessaly/Thessalians, etc., all being parts of the Hellenic world and identity for thousands of years. The name Macedonia/Macedonian has been copyrighted by Greece for thousands of years. Greece used the self-determination right first and she named one of her provinces Macedonia, first.
The analysis was prepared by Professor Nina Gatzoulis, President of the Pan-Macedonian Association and edited by Dr. Antonios Papadopoulos, Vice-President of the Pan-Macedonian Association.
Monday, March 24, 2008
Regarding "Macedonia: Reaching Out To Win Latin American Hearts and Minds"
The points made by Zlatko Kovach in Op-Ed piece, Macedonia: Reaching Out to Win Latin American Hearts and Minds, have been responded to by the Ambassador of Greece to the United States of America, Alexandros P. Mallias, in the following letter.
March 19, 2008
I must admit that Zlatko Kovach’s article entitled “Macedonia: Reaching out to win Latin American Hearts and Minds,” published on February 25, 2008, left me with a strong sense of surprise and amazement.
Aside from questioning Mr. Kovach’s dubious historical references regarding Greece as well as his own country, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), the article fails to acknowledge Greece’s significant role in the political and economic stability of FYROM and gives, I am afraid, COHA readers the wrong impression about Greece’s true role in the Balkan region.
As a longstanding EU and NATO member, Greece is a strong advocate of these organizations’ perspective as well as a supporter of the FYROM’s political, social and economic stability. In fact, Greece is currently the largest investor in FYROM, with over $1 billion of its capital invested there, translating to more than 30,000 jobs. Moreover, through the Hellenic Plan for the Economic Reconstruction of the Balkans (HiPERB), Greece has pledged the amount of approximately $112,260,000 of development aid for FYROM.
FYROM joined the United Nations and all relevant UN Agencies and Bodies under this official international name. UN Security Council Resolution 817 (1993) specifically provides that “the difference over the name of the state (i.e. FYROM) needs to be resolved in the interest of the maintenance of peaceful and good neighborly relations in the region.”
FYROM, therefore, participates in all international organizations and conferences under this official name. Indeed, it is under that name that it established relations with the European Union and NATO, and gained membership to the Organization for the Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. In fact, no single regional or international organization refers to FYROM by any other name. Greece does abide with UN Resolutions 817 and 845 and seeks a solution to the name issue within the United Nations framework.
Your article also fails to recognize that Greece’s stance has very strong support in the United States Congress, which can be no mere coincidence. Senate Resolution 300, introduced by Senator Robert Menendez, and co-sponsored by Senators Barack Obama and Olympia Snowe, urges FYROM to cease hostile activities and propaganda against Greece, and reach a mutually acceptable solution. In addition, over 115 Congressmen have thus far co-sponsored House Resolution 356 on the same topic in the House of Representatives.
Crucial and delicate negotiations are currently in progress under the United Nations auspices, and intensive diplomatic efforts are required on both sides to reach a mutually acceptable solution prior to the upcoming NATO Summit in April 2008. The Greek government has taken a significant step towards that direction by announcing Greece’s readiness to accept a composite name for the FYROM with a geographic qualifier.
It is now time for FYROM and its leadership to reach out and demonstrate the political maturity, which will bring an end to the name issue, and clear the path to its European and NATO perspective. Mr. Kovach may still argue that the current United Nations process, as provided for by the UN Security Council Resolutions 817(1993) and 845(1993), is unfair to his country. But he will once again have forgotten that, as an aspiring EU and NATO member, FYROM needs, first of all, to realize that abiding with international law obligations is not an “artificial dispute” imposed by Greece, but rather a fundamental code of conduct, which applies to all.
Jorge Luis Borges once said: “For the longest time, my contemporaries are the Greeks”, which in itself sums up the profound cultural, intellectual and spiritual bonds between Greece and Latin America. Greece’s longstanding relationship with Latin American countries is furthermore characterized by strong historic ties of friendship, solidarity and cooperation. Despite the geographical distance, Greece and Latin American countries have forged a close bond between their peoples by sharing and defending precious common values, such as security, democracy and peace, concepts enshrined in the UN and OAS Charters.
I am confident that the friendly Latin American countries understand that Greece greatly respects the identity and culture of others. I am also confident that they also understand the importance for countries, which claim to abide by the rules of international law, to also act so, in order to respect the historic and cultural heritage of their neighbors, and not systematically engage in provocative propaganda prejudicial to the fundamental principle of good neighborliness. I am afraid that at this time, this is the case with FYROM’s policies vis-a-vis Greece.
*******
March 19, 2008
I must admit that Zlatko Kovach’s article entitled “Macedonia: Reaching out to win Latin American Hearts and Minds,” published on February 25, 2008, left me with a strong sense of surprise and amazement.
Aside from questioning Mr. Kovach’s dubious historical references regarding Greece as well as his own country, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), the article fails to acknowledge Greece’s significant role in the political and economic stability of FYROM and gives, I am afraid, COHA readers the wrong impression about Greece’s true role in the Balkan region.
As a longstanding EU and NATO member, Greece is a strong advocate of these organizations’ perspective as well as a supporter of the FYROM’s political, social and economic stability. In fact, Greece is currently the largest investor in FYROM, with over $1 billion of its capital invested there, translating to more than 30,000 jobs. Moreover, through the Hellenic Plan for the Economic Reconstruction of the Balkans (HiPERB), Greece has pledged the amount of approximately $112,260,000 of development aid for FYROM.
FYROM joined the United Nations and all relevant UN Agencies and Bodies under this official international name. UN Security Council Resolution 817 (1993) specifically provides that “the difference over the name of the state (i.e. FYROM) needs to be resolved in the interest of the maintenance of peaceful and good neighborly relations in the region.”
FYROM, therefore, participates in all international organizations and conferences under this official name. Indeed, it is under that name that it established relations with the European Union and NATO, and gained membership to the Organization for the Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. In fact, no single regional or international organization refers to FYROM by any other name. Greece does abide with UN Resolutions 817 and 845 and seeks a solution to the name issue within the United Nations framework.
Your article also fails to recognize that Greece’s stance has very strong support in the United States Congress, which can be no mere coincidence. Senate Resolution 300, introduced by Senator Robert Menendez, and co-sponsored by Senators Barack Obama and Olympia Snowe, urges FYROM to cease hostile activities and propaganda against Greece, and reach a mutually acceptable solution. In addition, over 115 Congressmen have thus far co-sponsored House Resolution 356 on the same topic in the House of Representatives.
Crucial and delicate negotiations are currently in progress under the United Nations auspices, and intensive diplomatic efforts are required on both sides to reach a mutually acceptable solution prior to the upcoming NATO Summit in April 2008. The Greek government has taken a significant step towards that direction by announcing Greece’s readiness to accept a composite name for the FYROM with a geographic qualifier.
It is now time for FYROM and its leadership to reach out and demonstrate the political maturity, which will bring an end to the name issue, and clear the path to its European and NATO perspective. Mr. Kovach may still argue that the current United Nations process, as provided for by the UN Security Council Resolutions 817(1993) and 845(1993), is unfair to his country. But he will once again have forgotten that, as an aspiring EU and NATO member, FYROM needs, first of all, to realize that abiding with international law obligations is not an “artificial dispute” imposed by Greece, but rather a fundamental code of conduct, which applies to all.
Jorge Luis Borges once said: “For the longest time, my contemporaries are the Greeks”, which in itself sums up the profound cultural, intellectual and spiritual bonds between Greece and Latin America. Greece’s longstanding relationship with Latin American countries is furthermore characterized by strong historic ties of friendship, solidarity and cooperation. Despite the geographical distance, Greece and Latin American countries have forged a close bond between their peoples by sharing and defending precious common values, such as security, democracy and peace, concepts enshrined in the UN and OAS Charters.
I am confident that the friendly Latin American countries understand that Greece greatly respects the identity and culture of others. I am also confident that they also understand the importance for countries, which claim to abide by the rules of international law, to also act so, in order to respect the historic and cultural heritage of their neighbors, and not systematically engage in provocative propaganda prejudicial to the fundamental principle of good neighborliness. I am afraid that at this time, this is the case with FYROM’s policies vis-a-vis Greece.
*******
Monday, December 10, 2007
COHA's response to commentary on the FTAs piece
COHA would like to thank its readers for their contribution to the debate on Free Trade Agreements.
(See COHA press release Peru, Yes; Colombia? Free Trade Agreements: Lessons from Latin America’s Recent Past)
--------------------------------------
Regarding Hugo Fitch’s comments:
“LatAm is better educated than you think. It’s not just economists like Rafael Correa, but the Argentinian government, and the bitter experience of the poor of the whole continent that can demonstrate what these deals really mean - more inequality. Please don’t be so dismissive of those who oppose FTAs. If the US wants favourable deals it must concede rights to nations who cannot afford to subsidise their own markets on the US/EU models, namely the chance to protect them with specific tariffs. But such deals are never put on the table, because FTAs are not about fairness but profit and buying influence to stop LatAm working together for itself.”
Of course Mr. Fitch is correct.
COHA was not trying to be dismissive of those who oppose FTAs with the U.S. Actually, the piece describes the viewpoints of those who oppose U.S.-backed FTAs: the "TLC: Así No" movement in Peru, the opposition by Colombian leaders, the comments by an economist in Chile who opposes the current U.S.-Chile FTA, among others.
There are many well-prepared economists in the region who deserve credit. Unfortunately, those Latin American economists and leaders who disagree with the conditions of U.S.-backed FTAs usually do not get to sit at the negotiation table.
--------------------------------------
Regarding Richard Vizor’s comments:
“But to categorically state that there were massive human rights violations during Garcia’s first term is nonsense and totally incorrect. If they want to find massive, tell them to look up Fujimorii’s tenure and, the actions of Montesino. In fact, this is what Fujimori’s is most favorably known for in Peru … he stopped the Sendero. It certainly was not Garcia who had already vacated power BEFORE the most gruesome of the Sendero’s actions (and, the Government’s reactions to them). Get your facts straightened out, Messrs. COHA!!!”
Of course, he is right in saying that Fujimori was far more guilty than Garcia in sanctioning the murder of thousands of members of Sendero and those thought to be their sympathizers. But here are some facts that suggest that Garcia was guilty of rights violations during his first term in office and never had to answer them.
-According to the U.N., in 1987 there were 559 forced disappearances worldwide, of which 133 (nearly one fourth), occurred in Peru. During Garcia’s term, Peru had the highest number of forced disappearances in the world.
-Human Rights Watch says in a report: “García first served as president from 1985 to 1990, at the height of a bloody civil conflict in which an estimated 69,000 people lost their lives, many of them victims of atrocities committed by irregular armed groups and by government forces.”
-Peru’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission reported that the armed forces were responsible for 28 percent of the 69,280 who were killed or disappeared.
-Salomon Lerner, president of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, said “We have reconstructed history and we have reached the conclusion that it would not have been so grave if it were not for the indifference, passivity, and simple ineptness of those who held the highest political office at the time.”
For all of his bluster, President Garcia’s record deserves close examination and not plaudits.
--------------------------------------
Regarding jb’s comments:
“This FTA request was initiated by the Toledo administration. Had Congress not played politics and delayed this approval (only to rub it in Bush’s nose) it would have been approved while Alejandro Toledo was still in office. Toledo was never a part of any dirty war.”
Toledo was never a part of any dirty war and he did initiate the FTA request. But Toledo introduced the FTA with the U.S. to the legislature during his final months in office. Peru’s push for the deal has taken place mostly during Garcia’s second term. Therefore, Garcia will be willing to interpret the approval of the trade deal as his own political success.
(See COHA press release Peru, Yes; Colombia? Free Trade Agreements: Lessons from Latin America’s Recent Past)
--------------------------------------
Regarding Hugo Fitch’s comments:
“LatAm is better educated than you think. It’s not just economists like Rafael Correa, but the Argentinian government, and the bitter experience of the poor of the whole continent that can demonstrate what these deals really mean - more inequality. Please don’t be so dismissive of those who oppose FTAs. If the US wants favourable deals it must concede rights to nations who cannot afford to subsidise their own markets on the US/EU models, namely the chance to protect them with specific tariffs. But such deals are never put on the table, because FTAs are not about fairness but profit and buying influence to stop LatAm working together for itself.”
Of course Mr. Fitch is correct.
COHA was not trying to be dismissive of those who oppose FTAs with the U.S. Actually, the piece describes the viewpoints of those who oppose U.S.-backed FTAs: the "TLC: Así No" movement in Peru, the opposition by Colombian leaders, the comments by an economist in Chile who opposes the current U.S.-Chile FTA, among others.
There are many well-prepared economists in the region who deserve credit. Unfortunately, those Latin American economists and leaders who disagree with the conditions of U.S.-backed FTAs usually do not get to sit at the negotiation table.
--------------------------------------
Regarding Richard Vizor’s comments:
“But to categorically state that there were massive human rights violations during Garcia’s first term is nonsense and totally incorrect. If they want to find massive, tell them to look up Fujimorii’s tenure and, the actions of Montesino. In fact, this is what Fujimori’s is most favorably known for in Peru … he stopped the Sendero. It certainly was not Garcia who had already vacated power BEFORE the most gruesome of the Sendero’s actions (and, the Government’s reactions to them). Get your facts straightened out, Messrs. COHA!!!”
Of course, he is right in saying that Fujimori was far more guilty than Garcia in sanctioning the murder of thousands of members of Sendero and those thought to be their sympathizers. But here are some facts that suggest that Garcia was guilty of rights violations during his first term in office and never had to answer them.
-According to the U.N., in 1987 there were 559 forced disappearances worldwide, of which 133 (nearly one fourth), occurred in Peru. During Garcia’s term, Peru had the highest number of forced disappearances in the world.
-Human Rights Watch says in a report: “García first served as president from 1985 to 1990, at the height of a bloody civil conflict in which an estimated 69,000 people lost their lives, many of them victims of atrocities committed by irregular armed groups and by government forces.”
-Peru’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission reported that the armed forces were responsible for 28 percent of the 69,280 who were killed or disappeared.
-Salomon Lerner, president of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, said “We have reconstructed history and we have reached the conclusion that it would not have been so grave if it were not for the indifference, passivity, and simple ineptness of those who held the highest political office at the time.”
For all of his bluster, President Garcia’s record deserves close examination and not plaudits.
--------------------------------------
Regarding jb’s comments:
“This FTA request was initiated by the Toledo administration. Had Congress not played politics and delayed this approval (only to rub it in Bush’s nose) it would have been approved while Alejandro Toledo was still in office. Toledo was never a part of any dirty war.”
Toledo was never a part of any dirty war and he did initiate the FTA request. But Toledo introduced the FTA with the U.S. to the legislature during his final months in office. Peru’s push for the deal has taken place mostly during Garcia’s second term. Therefore, Garcia will be willing to interpret the approval of the trade deal as his own political success.
Wednesday, December 05, 2007
Regarding COHA's coverage of Haiti
Dear Larry Birns,
Greetings from South Africa, my name is Thabo Sanyane formerly [2003-2006] with the center for latin american at the university of south africa[ where Aristide currently works] as a research fellow in the faculty of religious studies.
It was during this time that i was introduced to COHA I have never missed any issue ever since , your coverage on Haiti does not need one to have decades of knowledge about the politics of this country to know what is going on and make informed analysis, I continue to discuss and interact with Aristide from time to time and my conclusion of the man is that he is a 'Nelson Mandela" to his people and hope that one day he will be treated as part of the solution in Haiti not as a problem. I was moved by your last sentence on the -Preval goes it alone, but what about Aristide, " Preval and the national assembly will be respectful as they try to repair the nation and its basic institutions, as well as honor Aristide for his undeniable contribution helping build a good society, as Haiti moves on to better days.
As a non Zulu speaking South African every time I meet Aristide I become proud of him in the manner he is mastered to learn to speak Zulu, he has recently finished his Doctoral studies comparing Haitian cultures and African cultures making a contribution towards knowledge production in my country. may the ancestors protect and guide him on his ways.
regards,
Thabo Sanyane
Greetings from South Africa, my name is Thabo Sanyane formerly [2003-2006] with the center for latin american at the university of south africa[ where Aristide currently works] as a research fellow in the faculty of religious studies.
It was during this time that i was introduced to COHA I have never missed any issue ever since , your coverage on Haiti does not need one to have decades of knowledge about the politics of this country to know what is going on and make informed analysis, I continue to discuss and interact with Aristide from time to time and my conclusion of the man is that he is a 'Nelson Mandela" to his people and hope that one day he will be treated as part of the solution in Haiti not as a problem. I was moved by your last sentence on the -Preval goes it alone, but what about Aristide, " Preval and the national assembly will be respectful as they try to repair the nation and its basic institutions, as well as honor Aristide for his undeniable contribution helping build a good society, as Haiti moves on to better days.
As a non Zulu speaking South African every time I meet Aristide I become proud of him in the manner he is mastered to learn to speak Zulu, he has recently finished his Doctoral studies comparing Haitian cultures and African cultures making a contribution towards knowledge production in my country. may the ancestors protect and guide him on his ways.
regards,
Thabo Sanyane
Friday, November 30, 2007
Venezuela: some cautionary words from Prof. Thomas Walker
Thomas Walker is Professor Emeritus of Political Science and Director Emeritus of Latin American Studies at Ohio University.
As a grizzly, grumpy old professor who has watched the behavior of the United States in Latin America for a number of years, I am increasingly worried nowadays about the real possibility that the US may be about to foment a coup in Venezuela. We've done it a number of times in other countries and unsuccessfully once in Venezuela itself in 2002.
I would ask you all to be very suspicious if our media and government start beating their breast over the killing of peaceful opposition marchers in the planned demonstration protesting the constitutional referendum this Sunday. As a Nicaraguanist I remember the CIA's lengthy terror manual, Psychological Operations in Guerrila Warfare (by "Tayacan") instructing the Nicaraguan opposition in a variety of very dirty tricks to be employed in overthrowing the Sandinista government. This document was published in English in 1985 and is easily available in hard copy or on the line in English, Spanish or Portuguese.
Of interest to us in particular should be pages 84 and 85. On p.85 "Tayacan" instructs us that "If possible, professional criminals will be hired to carry out specific selected 'jobs'." Then, on the very next page, he tells us that "Specific tasks will be assigned to others, in order to create a 'martyr' for the cause, taking the demonstrators to a confrontation with the authorities, in order to bring about uprisings or shootings, which will cause the death of one or more persons who will become martyrs..."
The clear implication is that, if the government does not oblige in creating the requisite "martyr" or "martyrs" this should be done by the aforementioned "professional criminals hired to carry out selected 'jobs'" - i.e. sniper assassins.
You may or may not remember, that in the failed coup attempt of 2002, the "brutal murder of unarmed demonstrators" was served up to us by the US and Venezuelan opposition media as a "last straw" justifying the overthrow of the evil Chavez. A number of demonstrators had, indeed, been shot dead. The perfect touch! And the anti-Chavez media showed red-shirted Chavez supporter firing off a bridge and anti-Chavez demonstrators in a crowd of marchers falling from fatal gun wounds. The only problem with this juxtaposition of images is that the Chavistas were actually firing down a largely empty avenue in the direction of a unit of rebel Caracas police, while the "marters" were being killed very professionally by gunmen firing from a completely different direction and obviously using extremely accurate weapons which could inflict one fatal wound after another. For more on that see La Revolucion no Sera Transmitida, a documentary shot during the coup attempt.
Not that Chavistas have not shot people. However, I would urge us all to be skeptical if in a few days we are treated to yet another "perfect storm" of coup-justifying propaganda a la "Tayacan" and Venezuela 2002.
As a grizzly, grumpy old professor who has watched the behavior of the United States in Latin America for a number of years, I am increasingly worried nowadays about the real possibility that the US may be about to foment a coup in Venezuela. We've done it a number of times in other countries and unsuccessfully once in Venezuela itself in 2002.
I would ask you all to be very suspicious if our media and government start beating their breast over the killing of peaceful opposition marchers in the planned demonstration protesting the constitutional referendum this Sunday. As a Nicaraguanist I remember the CIA's lengthy terror manual, Psychological Operations in Guerrila Warfare (by "Tayacan") instructing the Nicaraguan opposition in a variety of very dirty tricks to be employed in overthrowing the Sandinista government. This document was published in English in 1985 and is easily available in hard copy or on the line in English, Spanish or Portuguese.
Of interest to us in particular should be pages 84 and 85. On p.85 "Tayacan" instructs us that "If possible, professional criminals will be hired to carry out specific selected 'jobs'." Then, on the very next page, he tells us that "Specific tasks will be assigned to others, in order to create a 'martyr' for the cause, taking the demonstrators to a confrontation with the authorities, in order to bring about uprisings or shootings, which will cause the death of one or more persons who will become martyrs..."
The clear implication is that, if the government does not oblige in creating the requisite "martyr" or "martyrs" this should be done by the aforementioned "professional criminals hired to carry out selected 'jobs'" - i.e. sniper assassins.
You may or may not remember, that in the failed coup attempt of 2002, the "brutal murder of unarmed demonstrators" was served up to us by the US and Venezuelan opposition media as a "last straw" justifying the overthrow of the evil Chavez. A number of demonstrators had, indeed, been shot dead. The perfect touch! And the anti-Chavez media showed red-shirted Chavez supporter firing off a bridge and anti-Chavez demonstrators in a crowd of marchers falling from fatal gun wounds. The only problem with this juxtaposition of images is that the Chavistas were actually firing down a largely empty avenue in the direction of a unit of rebel Caracas police, while the "marters" were being killed very professionally by gunmen firing from a completely different direction and obviously using extremely accurate weapons which could inflict one fatal wound after another. For more on that see La Revolucion no Sera Transmitida, a documentary shot during the coup attempt.
Not that Chavistas have not shot people. However, I would urge us all to be skeptical if in a few days we are treated to yet another "perfect storm" of coup-justifying propaganda a la "Tayacan" and Venezuela 2002.
Friday, November 09, 2007
Regarding "Nearly All-White Argentina Confronts Its Troubled Racist and Religious Past"
COHA would like to thank Hugh Schwartz for his insight into this important topic. Dr. Schwartz was a Fulbright Lecturer and held visiting professorships in finance and economics in Uruguay, Brazil, and Mexico.
I think that this article is quite admirable. Even so, there are a few items that might be noted.
During the first Peron administrations, there was a substantial immigration into the country from Paraguay, Bolivia and Peru, and a substantial flow of persons from Northern Argentina to Greater Buenos Aires and Rosario of "cabezas negras" --both groups of which were almost entirely mestizo, mixed Indian and white (though largely of Indian background). These darker skinned inhabitants continue as part of Argentina's population and are probably of the order of 10-12% of the population.
A small but significant portion of Jewish immigration during the 1890s and early 1900s went to Entre Rios and Santa Fe, particularly to agricultural settlements, aided by a prominent Jewish philanthropist from France. While much of that group eventually migrated to Greater Buenos Aires, some still remain active in agriculture and pursuits related to agriculture. In the past, several of the provincial Ministers of Agriculture in that part of Argentina have been Jewish. Argentina's Jewish population probably was of the order of 350,000 - 500,000 during the period from the 1940s through the 1960s and may have been 2-3% of the population, comparable to the proportion in the U.S. Many emigrated to Israel and the U.S. The percentage of the population that is Jewish these days is probably between 1 and 2%, higher than the 1% in Uruguay (which was once about 1 1/2 %), and much higher than in all other Latin American countries, in none of which is it even as high as a quarter of one percent.
Hugh Schwartz
I think that this article is quite admirable. Even so, there are a few items that might be noted.
During the first Peron administrations, there was a substantial immigration into the country from Paraguay, Bolivia and Peru, and a substantial flow of persons from Northern Argentina to Greater Buenos Aires and Rosario of "cabezas negras" --both groups of which were almost entirely mestizo, mixed Indian and white (though largely of Indian background). These darker skinned inhabitants continue as part of Argentina's population and are probably of the order of 10-12% of the population.
A small but significant portion of Jewish immigration during the 1890s and early 1900s went to Entre Rios and Santa Fe, particularly to agricultural settlements, aided by a prominent Jewish philanthropist from France. While much of that group eventually migrated to Greater Buenos Aires, some still remain active in agriculture and pursuits related to agriculture. In the past, several of the provincial Ministers of Agriculture in that part of Argentina have been Jewish. Argentina's Jewish population probably was of the order of 350,000 - 500,000 during the period from the 1940s through the 1960s and may have been 2-3% of the population, comparable to the proportion in the U.S. Many emigrated to Israel and the U.S. The percentage of the population that is Jewish these days is probably between 1 and 2%, higher than the 1% in Uruguay (which was once about 1 1/2 %), and much higher than in all other Latin American countries, in none of which is it even as high as a quarter of one percent.
Hugh Schwartz
Tuesday, October 16, 2007
Haiti: Revisiting the Aristide debate - To Our Readers
There has been an intense dispute on the part of outside critics regarding COHA's piece on Haiti - which was issued on September 14, 2007. Its author, Michael Glenwick stands behind his article and the sharp criticism of former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, which has now been moved from COHA's website and can be found in COHA's Forum. After closely reviewing the Glenwick piece, COHA's senior officials regretfully concluded that much of the criticism of it – notably the September 21, 2007 critique of COHA's Haiti piece by Joe Emersberger for the Narco News Bulletin – was well-founded. It should also be noted that most of the contributions we received on the subject were opposed to our point of view; this is why we decided to submit the Glenwick article to a protracted review. Today we are replacing the Glenwick piece with a substantially revised version which was authored by COHA Director Larry Birns. This is now COHA's official position on the relative roles of Presidents Aristide and Préval and contains some glimpses of the former president's strengths and weaknesses, including his invaluable contribution to Haitian democracy.
Ever since he came into prominence in 1989, COHA has devoted much of its effort to spotlighting the life and times of President Aristide, stressing Washington's persistently radical and hostile rightwing attitude towards him under both the Clinton and Bush Administrations. From 2002-2004, COHA issued scores of analytical pieces on U.S.-Haitian relations written by Larry Birns, often in conjunction with COHA Research Fellow Jessica Leight. This included a co-authored contribution to Dr. Paul Farmer's "The Uses of Haiti" written in 2003: Mr. Emersberger was good enough to take note and praise this long association.
Please feel free to to read Glenwick's original article, and Emersberger's hard-hitting analysis of Glenwick's piece.
Ever since he came into prominence in 1989, COHA has devoted much of its effort to spotlighting the life and times of President Aristide, stressing Washington's persistently radical and hostile rightwing attitude towards him under both the Clinton and Bush Administrations. From 2002-2004, COHA issued scores of analytical pieces on U.S.-Haitian relations written by Larry Birns, often in conjunction with COHA Research Fellow Jessica Leight. This included a co-authored contribution to Dr. Paul Farmer's "The Uses of Haiti" written in 2003: Mr. Emersberger was good enough to take note and praise this long association.
Please feel free to to read Glenwick's original article, and Emersberger's hard-hitting analysis of Glenwick's piece.
Préval of Haiti—A Provisional Report Card: Grade B+
More than 18 months have passed since René Préval was overwhelmingly elected president of Haiti in what many regional analysts considered one of the country’s most crucial elections in decades. Within a period of only six years, Haitians had experienced a number of tumultuous events. It started with President Jean-Bertrand Aristide’s chaotic second term, in which international aid was suspended mainly due to accusations of election fraud surrounding his 2000 victory. Shortly thereafter, the 2004 coup d’état designed to oust Aristide and his government led to two wasted years under the unstable government of Interim-Prime Minister Gérard Latortue and President Boniface Alexandre, whose accomplishments were meager at best. In short, Haiti was in desperate need of an effective and democratically elected leader who would govern fairly and help inch the poverty-stricken state out of its traditional despair. Expectations were large, and it was Préval, in his second stint as president, who was expected to deliver on some, if not all, of those expectations beginning in February 2006.
Eight days after the 2006 election, international observers almost unanimously validated Préval as president and the elections as free and fair. It was hoped that the unblemished manner in which Préval won—through an entirely monitored democratic process that upheld the Haitian constitution—would establish a mindset for his rule. Whether that democratic process would be the hallmark of Préval’s time in office or just an early and later erasable blip on the screen would be essential to know in evaluating the effectiveness of his presidency. Now, more than a year and a half following what must have been Haiti’s fairest election in decades, it is time to take a look at what has transpired on the island in the intervening period. Was democracy as practiced by Préval to be just a calling card for international respectability, or was it intended as a constant thread of President Préval’s time in office? Following the period under Aristide defined by its endemic corruption and the equally rocky interim period under Alexandre when hundreds—if not thousands—of opposition party members were murdered, only a true, stable democracy, it was believed, would be able to start a long and difficult healing process.
Past and Present
Six years ago, President Aristide appeared to have given up hope of ruling the country with intense energy, constitutional devotion, or a tireless commitment to building democratic institutions. Perhaps due to the attempted coup in late 2001—or, just as likely, his own insensitivity to inclusive rule—Aristide seemed to manifest a show of lassitude to the rule of law as well as indifference to democratic institution building. He encouraged citizens to use violence when needed to fight the nation’s armed opposition, and civil liberties and political/human rights were in short supply. For all intents and purposes, there was a constitution in name only, something which newly elected President Préval, whom, it should be noted, was a close friend and political comrade of Aristide, promised to change.
At the time of Préval’s inauguration, the situation on the ground did not look entirely different than it did in 2001. But within a few months, some significant steps were taken in order to implement a series of necessary changes geared toward getting closer to the ideal of creating a democratic, law-abiding society and a fair-minded administration. The most important step taken was the first one—the implementation of free and open balloting, whose results no one contested. As much as that might be scoffed at due to Préval’s overwhelming popularity—he won with 51% of the vote, while runner-up Leslie Manigat obtained only 12% of the vote—it was an important signature that put Haiti back on track to democracy. Most importantly for average Haitians, this meant the reestablishment of much of the international aid that had been cut off during Aristide’s time in office; Préval’s government was earmarked to receive an additional $750 million in assistance from donor nations to be dispensed to Haiti’s population, indicating a major vote of confidence in his government by the world community.
Baby Steps for Democracy
With Préval’s decisive victory in the election, many analysts expected his Lespwa (Front of Hope) Party to also carry the day in the two legislative bodies, the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies (or lower house). Lespwa’s opponents shocked Préval and his backers, as his party was able to win only 13 out of 30 Senate seats and elect 23 out of 99 representatives in the Chamber of Deputies. Thus, Préval was thrown a curveball at the outset of his administration. Whereas the margin of his personal victory in the presidential race might have been enough to give him a mandate to rule as a strong leader, the disappointing results of the parliamentary elections were a stark reminder to him that, even if he wanted to introduce dramatic reforms, he would face major obstacles and likely would have to reach a variety of compromises with the Haitian parliamentary opposition. In addition, while Préval has gone some length to shape the legislature to cooperate with his agenda, he was unable to generate a working majority on day-to-day voting.
Préval’s Powers Are Less Than Monarchic
As a result of this early check on Préval’s power, few major pieces of legislation have been passed as of yet. In addition, since no other party held more seats than Lespwa, coalition building was, during much of the period following the election, a slow and laborious process, as in each instance Lespwa’s elected members tried, with little success, to achieve a working majority coalition. To a large extent, this was another important sign that, although legislative accomplishments might be slow in coming due to the lack of a working majority, the process would, at least, be democratic.
In 2000, Aristide’s Fanmi Lavalas party had “won” 26 of 27 senate seats and 73 of 83 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, leading to distrust of both the president and his agenda inside and outside the country. On the other hand, in 2006 and early 2007, individual Haitian political thinkers and international observers alike expressed their confidence that Préval, after he was elected, would have no choice but to govern democratically. While political developments and the policies that he wanted to push through the National Assembly have been slow in coming, the respect that he attracted and his acknowledgement of constitutional guarantees, which he freely offered to respect (unlike both authoritarian and professed democratic chief executives), were attributes that had been ignored for decades.
A closer look at how the National Assembly has functioned will help shed a little light on the status of democracy in the country. Its first—and, in many ways, most important—function was to approve Préval’s cabinet choices. Due to the nature of the competing political factions, this became a somewhat complex process. In the end, however, a cabinet that included members of six political parties was approved in a near unanimous vote; this was considered by both Préval’s supporters and opponents alike to be a vote of confidence for Préval’s rule. This process protected Haiti from the one-sided rule that had dominated the country for so long, and, most importantly, it demonstrated Préval’s willingness to strive for consensus and govern in a democratic fashion.
Soon after the cabinet was formed, the Assembly began taking a few of the necessary baby steps to effect political changes of its own. Many of the elected officials in both the Senate and Chamber of Deputies have begun to craft pieces of legislation that would help curb corruption in the courts. Although the National Assembly has been far from entirely successful, it is still trying to push legislation through in a democratic manner is an encouraging sign. This is something for which, in a recent visit to Port-au-Prince, United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon was moved to praise the National Assembly, as he encouraged lawmakers to adopt legislation reinforcing—if not establishing for the first time—the rule of law in the country. In previous years, the combination of corrupt, strongman presidents and the powerful influence of neighborhood gangs and association of elites has made doing so all but impossible. However, as the UN secretary general’s confidence in the National Assembly suggests, Haiti has a unique opportunity to change course. This is an opportunity that cannot be squandered, a fact which is recognized by both Préval and the opposition members of the legislative branch. When, in 2008, one-third of the Senate seats will be contested, the continued strengthening of the legislative process likely will be at the forefront of many candidates’ platforms.
Many Problems Remain on the Road to Democracy
Although the current state of president-assembly relations might suggest that all is well with democracy in Haiti, there are still significant problems that remain, suggesting that the island’s political process has traveled only a few miles on the long road to democracy. With the lack of a standing military force and the systemically problematic Haitian National Police, Haitians who oppose the government or voice thoroughly popular opinions defaming the police force often find that the law has not always been there to protect them.
Even when the law does come into play, its inefficiencies and unreliability usually don’t allow it to do much public good. The court system is weak, outdated, and, just like the tainted police and other fouled Haitian organizations, corrupt. Prisons themselves are old and unspeakably bleak. Prisoners live in overcrowded jails with only scraps of food; according to an Amnesty International report, more than 2000 prisoners are being held in Haitian jails without ever having been charged. At least 100 of those detained are said to be political prisoners. Furthermore, because there is a lack of resources to properly train personnel and provide decent conditions for the inmates, a significant turn of events would be necessary to allow for a truly democratic judicial and penal system to emerge.
The old-fashioned, poorly managed, and chronically corrupt judicial system is not the only aspect of Haitian society that suggests that Préval and his legislative associates have a long way to go if they are intent on ensuring the establishment of a long-lasting, genuinely democratic state. Labor conditions in Haiti continue to reflect a disdain for human rights and general democratic principles. For example, Haitian authorities have done little to change the old Haitian tradition of restavec, in which young Haitian children are sent away from their parents to work, for all intents and purposes, as domestic slaves for wealthier families in often far-off communities.
Although one can very well make the case that cultural traditions and values should be upheld whenever they can, such archaic practices do little to boost Haiti’s quest for a genuine democracy or a caring society. Meanwhile, along Haiti’s border with the Dominican Republic, little has been done to reinforce border security, with the illegal trafficking of Haitian laborers continuing to be a chronic problem with which the Port-au-Prince government has ineffectively dealt. To date, Haiti has done little to project its demands to implement border reforms with its neighbor. This may prove to be a significant challenge in the next few years, given the troubled history that the Haitians have had with the Dominicans, as well as the array of problems that Haitian refugees have brought upon their neighbors, including fighting for access to the resources that can be found there.
In recent years, Haiti’s gangs have posed serious problems for the country’s political leadership, and Préval, too, has not escaped from this problem. However, instead of choosing to let them dominate various street corners of Port-au-Prince and elsewhere in Haiti, Préval recently decided that he would take the matter into his own hands, something that Aristide (who chose to negotiate with the gang leaders) never did. Due to the lack of an efficient police force, Préval has had to rely on the current contingent of 7500 U.N. troops stationed in Haiti to do his bidding. Although this has brought about some success, the impaired state of the country’s judicial system means that many of the gangsters who have been arrested might not ever face justice. This series of recent actions concerning gangs raises a number of important questions that are likely to be resolved only after significant time has elapsed. Certainly, negotiating with the heads of brutal and power-hungry gangs has not advanced a society hoping to be orderly, exemplified by the ineffective results in Aristide’s dealings with the Cite Solei gangs. However, with corruption abounding in the courts, with the gang leaders’ pockets running deep, and with the jails already overflowing with citizens who haven’t even faced a trial, Préval’s does not have a wide range of choices.
A Long Road Ahead
Faced with the aforementioned gang problems, the acceleration of drug-related issues, and the ongoing practice of media self-censorship, Préval and the National Assembly have much work to do in shaping how the first elected government following Aristide’s ouster will ultimately be perceived by the public. However, if the recent is any indication, there is some ground for hope. Certainly, the government has quite a bit on its plate—passing legislation that might lead to an improvement next year of the country’s last-place finish in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index might not be a bad place to start. But at least the Préval government is doing things democratically. In both the executive and legislative branches, the signs are there: there is a growing respect for the law and the democratic process that were first spelled out in the country’s nearly 20-year-old constitution but never really honored until now. Democracy is not a word that should ever be toyed with, and we should not expect Haiti to turn into a shining model of democracy overnight. What we can expect, however, is that the country’s modernization and humanization will continue and that Préval and the Assembly will be respected as they try to repair the nation.
This analysis was prepared by COHA Research Associate Michael Glenwick
Eight days after the 2006 election, international observers almost unanimously validated Préval as president and the elections as free and fair. It was hoped that the unblemished manner in which Préval won—through an entirely monitored democratic process that upheld the Haitian constitution—would establish a mindset for his rule. Whether that democratic process would be the hallmark of Préval’s time in office or just an early and later erasable blip on the screen would be essential to know in evaluating the effectiveness of his presidency. Now, more than a year and a half following what must have been Haiti’s fairest election in decades, it is time to take a look at what has transpired on the island in the intervening period. Was democracy as practiced by Préval to be just a calling card for international respectability, or was it intended as a constant thread of President Préval’s time in office? Following the period under Aristide defined by its endemic corruption and the equally rocky interim period under Alexandre when hundreds—if not thousands—of opposition party members were murdered, only a true, stable democracy, it was believed, would be able to start a long and difficult healing process.
Past and Present
Six years ago, President Aristide appeared to have given up hope of ruling the country with intense energy, constitutional devotion, or a tireless commitment to building democratic institutions. Perhaps due to the attempted coup in late 2001—or, just as likely, his own insensitivity to inclusive rule—Aristide seemed to manifest a show of lassitude to the rule of law as well as indifference to democratic institution building. He encouraged citizens to use violence when needed to fight the nation’s armed opposition, and civil liberties and political/human rights were in short supply. For all intents and purposes, there was a constitution in name only, something which newly elected President Préval, whom, it should be noted, was a close friend and political comrade of Aristide, promised to change.
At the time of Préval’s inauguration, the situation on the ground did not look entirely different than it did in 2001. But within a few months, some significant steps were taken in order to implement a series of necessary changes geared toward getting closer to the ideal of creating a democratic, law-abiding society and a fair-minded administration. The most important step taken was the first one—the implementation of free and open balloting, whose results no one contested. As much as that might be scoffed at due to Préval’s overwhelming popularity—he won with 51% of the vote, while runner-up Leslie Manigat obtained only 12% of the vote—it was an important signature that put Haiti back on track to democracy. Most importantly for average Haitians, this meant the reestablishment of much of the international aid that had been cut off during Aristide’s time in office; Préval’s government was earmarked to receive an additional $750 million in assistance from donor nations to be dispensed to Haiti’s population, indicating a major vote of confidence in his government by the world community.
Baby Steps for Democracy
With Préval’s decisive victory in the election, many analysts expected his Lespwa (Front of Hope) Party to also carry the day in the two legislative bodies, the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies (or lower house). Lespwa’s opponents shocked Préval and his backers, as his party was able to win only 13 out of 30 Senate seats and elect 23 out of 99 representatives in the Chamber of Deputies. Thus, Préval was thrown a curveball at the outset of his administration. Whereas the margin of his personal victory in the presidential race might have been enough to give him a mandate to rule as a strong leader, the disappointing results of the parliamentary elections were a stark reminder to him that, even if he wanted to introduce dramatic reforms, he would face major obstacles and likely would have to reach a variety of compromises with the Haitian parliamentary opposition. In addition, while Préval has gone some length to shape the legislature to cooperate with his agenda, he was unable to generate a working majority on day-to-day voting.
Préval’s Powers Are Less Than Monarchic
As a result of this early check on Préval’s power, few major pieces of legislation have been passed as of yet. In addition, since no other party held more seats than Lespwa, coalition building was, during much of the period following the election, a slow and laborious process, as in each instance Lespwa’s elected members tried, with little success, to achieve a working majority coalition. To a large extent, this was another important sign that, although legislative accomplishments might be slow in coming due to the lack of a working majority, the process would, at least, be democratic.
In 2000, Aristide’s Fanmi Lavalas party had “won” 26 of 27 senate seats and 73 of 83 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, leading to distrust of both the president and his agenda inside and outside the country. On the other hand, in 2006 and early 2007, individual Haitian political thinkers and international observers alike expressed their confidence that Préval, after he was elected, would have no choice but to govern democratically. While political developments and the policies that he wanted to push through the National Assembly have been slow in coming, the respect that he attracted and his acknowledgement of constitutional guarantees, which he freely offered to respect (unlike both authoritarian and professed democratic chief executives), were attributes that had been ignored for decades.
A closer look at how the National Assembly has functioned will help shed a little light on the status of democracy in the country. Its first—and, in many ways, most important—function was to approve Préval’s cabinet choices. Due to the nature of the competing political factions, this became a somewhat complex process. In the end, however, a cabinet that included members of six political parties was approved in a near unanimous vote; this was considered by both Préval’s supporters and opponents alike to be a vote of confidence for Préval’s rule. This process protected Haiti from the one-sided rule that had dominated the country for so long, and, most importantly, it demonstrated Préval’s willingness to strive for consensus and govern in a democratic fashion.
Soon after the cabinet was formed, the Assembly began taking a few of the necessary baby steps to effect political changes of its own. Many of the elected officials in both the Senate and Chamber of Deputies have begun to craft pieces of legislation that would help curb corruption in the courts. Although the National Assembly has been far from entirely successful, it is still trying to push legislation through in a democratic manner is an encouraging sign. This is something for which, in a recent visit to Port-au-Prince, United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon was moved to praise the National Assembly, as he encouraged lawmakers to adopt legislation reinforcing—if not establishing for the first time—the rule of law in the country. In previous years, the combination of corrupt, strongman presidents and the powerful influence of neighborhood gangs and association of elites has made doing so all but impossible. However, as the UN secretary general’s confidence in the National Assembly suggests, Haiti has a unique opportunity to change course. This is an opportunity that cannot be squandered, a fact which is recognized by both Préval and the opposition members of the legislative branch. When, in 2008, one-third of the Senate seats will be contested, the continued strengthening of the legislative process likely will be at the forefront of many candidates’ platforms.
Many Problems Remain on the Road to Democracy
Although the current state of president-assembly relations might suggest that all is well with democracy in Haiti, there are still significant problems that remain, suggesting that the island’s political process has traveled only a few miles on the long road to democracy. With the lack of a standing military force and the systemically problematic Haitian National Police, Haitians who oppose the government or voice thoroughly popular opinions defaming the police force often find that the law has not always been there to protect them.
Even when the law does come into play, its inefficiencies and unreliability usually don’t allow it to do much public good. The court system is weak, outdated, and, just like the tainted police and other fouled Haitian organizations, corrupt. Prisons themselves are old and unspeakably bleak. Prisoners live in overcrowded jails with only scraps of food; according to an Amnesty International report, more than 2000 prisoners are being held in Haitian jails without ever having been charged. At least 100 of those detained are said to be political prisoners. Furthermore, because there is a lack of resources to properly train personnel and provide decent conditions for the inmates, a significant turn of events would be necessary to allow for a truly democratic judicial and penal system to emerge.
The old-fashioned, poorly managed, and chronically corrupt judicial system is not the only aspect of Haitian society that suggests that Préval and his legislative associates have a long way to go if they are intent on ensuring the establishment of a long-lasting, genuinely democratic state. Labor conditions in Haiti continue to reflect a disdain for human rights and general democratic principles. For example, Haitian authorities have done little to change the old Haitian tradition of restavec, in which young Haitian children are sent away from their parents to work, for all intents and purposes, as domestic slaves for wealthier families in often far-off communities.
Although one can very well make the case that cultural traditions and values should be upheld whenever they can, such archaic practices do little to boost Haiti’s quest for a genuine democracy or a caring society. Meanwhile, along Haiti’s border with the Dominican Republic, little has been done to reinforce border security, with the illegal trafficking of Haitian laborers continuing to be a chronic problem with which the Port-au-Prince government has ineffectively dealt. To date, Haiti has done little to project its demands to implement border reforms with its neighbor. This may prove to be a significant challenge in the next few years, given the troubled history that the Haitians have had with the Dominicans, as well as the array of problems that Haitian refugees have brought upon their neighbors, including fighting for access to the resources that can be found there.
In recent years, Haiti’s gangs have posed serious problems for the country’s political leadership, and Préval, too, has not escaped from this problem. However, instead of choosing to let them dominate various street corners of Port-au-Prince and elsewhere in Haiti, Préval recently decided that he would take the matter into his own hands, something that Aristide (who chose to negotiate with the gang leaders) never did. Due to the lack of an efficient police force, Préval has had to rely on the current contingent of 7500 U.N. troops stationed in Haiti to do his bidding. Although this has brought about some success, the impaired state of the country’s judicial system means that many of the gangsters who have been arrested might not ever face justice. This series of recent actions concerning gangs raises a number of important questions that are likely to be resolved only after significant time has elapsed. Certainly, negotiating with the heads of brutal and power-hungry gangs has not advanced a society hoping to be orderly, exemplified by the ineffective results in Aristide’s dealings with the Cite Solei gangs. However, with corruption abounding in the courts, with the gang leaders’ pockets running deep, and with the jails already overflowing with citizens who haven’t even faced a trial, Préval’s does not have a wide range of choices.
A Long Road Ahead
Faced with the aforementioned gang problems, the acceleration of drug-related issues, and the ongoing practice of media self-censorship, Préval and the National Assembly have much work to do in shaping how the first elected government following Aristide’s ouster will ultimately be perceived by the public. However, if the recent is any indication, there is some ground for hope. Certainly, the government has quite a bit on its plate—passing legislation that might lead to an improvement next year of the country’s last-place finish in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index might not be a bad place to start. But at least the Préval government is doing things democratically. In both the executive and legislative branches, the signs are there: there is a growing respect for the law and the democratic process that were first spelled out in the country’s nearly 20-year-old constitution but never really honored until now. Democracy is not a word that should ever be toyed with, and we should not expect Haiti to turn into a shining model of democracy overnight. What we can expect, however, is that the country’s modernization and humanization will continue and that Préval and the Assembly will be respected as they try to repair the nation.
This analysis was prepared by COHA Research Associate Michael Glenwick
Monday, September 24, 2007
The Council on Hemispheric Affairs Deserves an F for Article on Haiti
Originally posted at http://www.narconews.com/Issue46/article2784.html
By Joe Emersberger
Special to The Narco News Bulletin
September 21, 2007
COHA, The Council on Hemispheric Affairs, recently published a piece by one of its research associates, Michael Glenwick, entitled “Préval of Haiti — A Provisional Report Card: Grade B+.” In it, Glenwick recycles the smears that contributed to Haitian President Aristide’s ouster in 2004 and, subsequently, to the worst human rights disaster in the Western Hemisphere. There can be no serious dispute about the scale of the bloodbath under Gerard Latortue’s coup installed government — one that was backed (quite predictably) by the US, Canada, France and the UN Security Council. Less predictable, and in some ways more important, was the backing Latortue received from progressive and “independent” institutions. Glenwick’s article moves COHA decisively into the camp of NGOs and media outlets that have served Haiti’s neo-Duvalierists so effectively in recent years. This represents a significant loss. Shortly before and after the coup, COHA stood admirably apart from the corporate media herd in its analysis of events in Haiti.
The opening paragraph of Glenwick’s article says that Latortue’s “accomplishments were meager at best” and that those years were “unstable” and “wasted.” In the next paragraph Glenwick says that “hundreds — if not thousands — of opposition party members were murdered” under Latortue. One is left wondering how many Haitians would have to die before Glenwick would condemn Latortue rather than offer modest praise and mild rebukes. In contrast, COHA’s Jeesica Leigh wrote a piece in 2004, coauthored by COHA director Larry Birns, about Latortue’s government entitled “A brutal regime shows its true colors.”
Citing no evidence, Glenwick equates Aristide to Latortue by writing that Aristide’s time in office was an “equally rocky period” but then goes on to assess Aristide much more harshly than Latortue by writing “Perhaps due to the attempted coup in late 2001 — or, just as likely, his own insensitivity to inclusive rule — Aristide seemed to manifest a show of lassitude to the rule of law as well as indifference to democratic institution building. He encouraged citizens to use violence when needed to fight the nation’s armed opposition, and civil liberties and political/human rights were in short supply.”
People who care to look for evidence to evaluate Aristide’s human rights record, especially compared to Latortue, Cedras, Duvalier, would come to quite a different conclusion.
A scientific survey by Athena Kolbe and Royce Hudson found that at least 4000 political murders were perpetrated during Latortue’s time in office – overwhelmingly by government security forces and their proxies. In contrast, after scouring Amnesty International reports, Perter Hallward, a UK based researcher, wrote “Amnesty International’s reports covering the years 2000-03 attribute a total of around 20 to 30 killings to the police and supporters of the FL [Aristide’s party] — a far cry from the 5,000 committed by the junta and its supporters in 1991-94, let alone the 50,000 usually attributed to the Duvalier dictatorships.”
Pierre Esperance, one of Aristide’s most vehement, and dishonest, critics claimed in a (successful) funding request to the Canadian government that 100 people had been killed (not all Aristide opponents) during the “last several months” before the coup which he described as the worst period under Aristide.*
These numbers do not only reveal that Aristide’s track record was vastly superior to his opponents, they also show why it was inevitable that some of his partisans would conclude that violence was justified. Even during most of his second term Aristide’s supporters were more likely to be killed than his opponents’ supporters.[6] Glenwick completely disregards the massive amount of violence Haiti’s poor have been subjected to, and the threats they continually faced, to join the chorus of pious Western intellectuals who condemn Aristide for having said that the poor have the right to defend themselves. Many of those intellectuals also argue that the U.S. has the right to bomb defenseless countries thousands of miles away in “self defense.” The hypocrisy is as breathtaking as it is unnoticed by countless writers who have condemned Aristide for “incendiary” speeches.
Astonishingly, Glenwick refers to the presidential election that Preval won as “Haiti’s fairest election in decades.” In reality, as COHA accurately reported at the time, the election was a “caricature of the real thing.” Preval won, not because the election was fair, but because his opponents were so despised that they couldn’t win an election they had rigged.
Prominent Aristide allies such as the Rev. Gerard Jean-Juste, So Ann, and Yvon Neptune were in jail on trumped up charges. Thousands of other Aristide supporters were also in prison, exiled or in hiding. Aristide strongholds were subjected to state sanctioned terrorism by the Haitian National Police (fully supported by UN troops). Again, much of this was documented by COHA (for example, in a piece entitled “Haiti – And you call this an election?” among other articles.)
Another barrier placed in the way of participation by Haiti’s poor was the number of polling stations. About ten times more stations were available when Aristide was elected in 2000. COHA reported “many Haitians will have to walk more than two hours just to reach a voting center.” Haitians endured huge lineups and travel time in order to vote. When it was clear Preval was headed for victory in the first round a last ditch attempt at fraud was attempted. A truckload of ballots marked for Preval was found in the trash. Huge, non-violent demonstrations pressured Latortue’s regime to honor the results.
Glenwick noted that Preval was “a close friend and political comrade of Aristide” but did not explain the significance of Preval’s victory. Preval was untarnished by participation in the coup or association with Aristide’s opponents. Haiti’s ambassador to the US, in a letter to the New York Times, used Preval’s candidacy to imply that Aristide’s Lavalas movement was not being persecuted.[10] Preval received the endorsement of the Rev. Gerard Jean-Juste, who was not allowed to register from prison as a candidate in the election. If Glenwick’s characterization of Aristide’s government had been accurate then Preval would never had stood a chance in a fair election, never mind one designed to disenfranchise most of the people who would vote for him.
The Herculean efforts required to elect Preval were not replicated during the legislative elections. The turnout was much lower than in the presidential election. Unpopular parties heavily backed by foreign democratization agencies obtained disproportionate power, but Glewnwick approvingly refers to this outcome as a necessary check on Preval. Glenwick’s fear is that, like Aristide, Preval might demonstrate “insensitivity to inclusive rule” (i.e. be reluctant to capitulate to politicians unable to win in fair elections).
Much of the material required to refute Glenwick is on COHA’s website. Did Glenwick read any of it? Did COHA’s editors? Should we expect a retraction of the articles COHA published in the past that refute Glenwick? Without engaging in Orwellian “doublethink” COHA must choose to either stand behind Glenwick’s analysis or their past work on Haiti. I hope people contact COHA director Larry Birns (larry.birns@gmail.com) and respectfully ask him which COHA articles he stands behind.
*Documents obtained under Freedom of Information act by Anthony Fenton, a Canadian independent journalist
By Joe Emersberger
Special to The Narco News Bulletin
September 21, 2007
COHA, The Council on Hemispheric Affairs, recently published a piece by one of its research associates, Michael Glenwick, entitled “Préval of Haiti — A Provisional Report Card: Grade B+.” In it, Glenwick recycles the smears that contributed to Haitian President Aristide’s ouster in 2004 and, subsequently, to the worst human rights disaster in the Western Hemisphere. There can be no serious dispute about the scale of the bloodbath under Gerard Latortue’s coup installed government — one that was backed (quite predictably) by the US, Canada, France and the UN Security Council. Less predictable, and in some ways more important, was the backing Latortue received from progressive and “independent” institutions. Glenwick’s article moves COHA decisively into the camp of NGOs and media outlets that have served Haiti’s neo-Duvalierists so effectively in recent years. This represents a significant loss. Shortly before and after the coup, COHA stood admirably apart from the corporate media herd in its analysis of events in Haiti.
The opening paragraph of Glenwick’s article says that Latortue’s “accomplishments were meager at best” and that those years were “unstable” and “wasted.” In the next paragraph Glenwick says that “hundreds — if not thousands — of opposition party members were murdered” under Latortue. One is left wondering how many Haitians would have to die before Glenwick would condemn Latortue rather than offer modest praise and mild rebukes. In contrast, COHA’s Jeesica Leigh wrote a piece in 2004, coauthored by COHA director Larry Birns, about Latortue’s government entitled “A brutal regime shows its true colors.”
Citing no evidence, Glenwick equates Aristide to Latortue by writing that Aristide’s time in office was an “equally rocky period” but then goes on to assess Aristide much more harshly than Latortue by writing “Perhaps due to the attempted coup in late 2001 — or, just as likely, his own insensitivity to inclusive rule — Aristide seemed to manifest a show of lassitude to the rule of law as well as indifference to democratic institution building. He encouraged citizens to use violence when needed to fight the nation’s armed opposition, and civil liberties and political/human rights were in short supply.”
People who care to look for evidence to evaluate Aristide’s human rights record, especially compared to Latortue, Cedras, Duvalier, would come to quite a different conclusion.
A scientific survey by Athena Kolbe and Royce Hudson found that at least 4000 political murders were perpetrated during Latortue’s time in office – overwhelmingly by government security forces and their proxies. In contrast, after scouring Amnesty International reports, Perter Hallward, a UK based researcher, wrote “Amnesty International’s reports covering the years 2000-03 attribute a total of around 20 to 30 killings to the police and supporters of the FL [Aristide’s party] — a far cry from the 5,000 committed by the junta and its supporters in 1991-94, let alone the 50,000 usually attributed to the Duvalier dictatorships.”
Pierre Esperance, one of Aristide’s most vehement, and dishonest, critics claimed in a (successful) funding request to the Canadian government that 100 people had been killed (not all Aristide opponents) during the “last several months” before the coup which he described as the worst period under Aristide.*
These numbers do not only reveal that Aristide’s track record was vastly superior to his opponents, they also show why it was inevitable that some of his partisans would conclude that violence was justified. Even during most of his second term Aristide’s supporters were more likely to be killed than his opponents’ supporters.[6] Glenwick completely disregards the massive amount of violence Haiti’s poor have been subjected to, and the threats they continually faced, to join the chorus of pious Western intellectuals who condemn Aristide for having said that the poor have the right to defend themselves. Many of those intellectuals also argue that the U.S. has the right to bomb defenseless countries thousands of miles away in “self defense.” The hypocrisy is as breathtaking as it is unnoticed by countless writers who have condemned Aristide for “incendiary” speeches.
Astonishingly, Glenwick refers to the presidential election that Preval won as “Haiti’s fairest election in decades.” In reality, as COHA accurately reported at the time, the election was a “caricature of the real thing.” Preval won, not because the election was fair, but because his opponents were so despised that they couldn’t win an election they had rigged.
Prominent Aristide allies such as the Rev. Gerard Jean-Juste, So Ann, and Yvon Neptune were in jail on trumped up charges. Thousands of other Aristide supporters were also in prison, exiled or in hiding. Aristide strongholds were subjected to state sanctioned terrorism by the Haitian National Police (fully supported by UN troops). Again, much of this was documented by COHA (for example, in a piece entitled “Haiti – And you call this an election?” among other articles.)
Another barrier placed in the way of participation by Haiti’s poor was the number of polling stations. About ten times more stations were available when Aristide was elected in 2000. COHA reported “many Haitians will have to walk more than two hours just to reach a voting center.” Haitians endured huge lineups and travel time in order to vote. When it was clear Preval was headed for victory in the first round a last ditch attempt at fraud was attempted. A truckload of ballots marked for Preval was found in the trash. Huge, non-violent demonstrations pressured Latortue’s regime to honor the results.
Glenwick noted that Preval was “a close friend and political comrade of Aristide” but did not explain the significance of Preval’s victory. Preval was untarnished by participation in the coup or association with Aristide’s opponents. Haiti’s ambassador to the US, in a letter to the New York Times, used Preval’s candidacy to imply that Aristide’s Lavalas movement was not being persecuted.[10] Preval received the endorsement of the Rev. Gerard Jean-Juste, who was not allowed to register from prison as a candidate in the election. If Glenwick’s characterization of Aristide’s government had been accurate then Preval would never had stood a chance in a fair election, never mind one designed to disenfranchise most of the people who would vote for him.
The Herculean efforts required to elect Preval were not replicated during the legislative elections. The turnout was much lower than in the presidential election. Unpopular parties heavily backed by foreign democratization agencies obtained disproportionate power, but Glewnwick approvingly refers to this outcome as a necessary check on Preval. Glenwick’s fear is that, like Aristide, Preval might demonstrate “insensitivity to inclusive rule” (i.e. be reluctant to capitulate to politicians unable to win in fair elections).
Much of the material required to refute Glenwick is on COHA’s website. Did Glenwick read any of it? Did COHA’s editors? Should we expect a retraction of the articles COHA published in the past that refute Glenwick? Without engaging in Orwellian “doublethink” COHA must choose to either stand behind Glenwick’s analysis or their past work on Haiti. I hope people contact COHA director Larry Birns (larry.birns@gmail.com) and respectfully ask him which COHA articles he stands behind.
*Documents obtained under Freedom of Information act by Anthony Fenton, a Canadian independent journalist
Wednesday, September 19, 2007
Regarding "Colombian Free Trade Pact Shot Down: One Step Forward for the U.S., One Back for Canada"
Letter received 7/19/2007
I read very carefully your “analysis” called Colombian Free Trade Pact Shot Down: One Step Forward for the U.S., One Back for Canada. Sincerely this opinion article, coming from a reputed organization such as yours that says it’s a non partisan, independent NGO or think tank, has so many tilted statements that it leaves much to be desired to be even called an analysis.
Let’s start with the title. It already has an opinion in it which, if you read carefully, is supported with phrases that also only can be called political statements. Let me pinpoint some:
“This is merely the latest devastating blow to the standing of Colombia’s hard-line right-wing president, Àlvaro Uribe, whose disapproval rating hit a high of 27 percent in a Gallup Poll published on July 14”. Sure any president in its fifth year with an approval of 65 % must be having “devastating” political problems.
“As well his imperious removal of Washington’s long-favored policy of being able to extradite Colombian felons upon request”. More than 500 extraditions in 5 years, ‘Rasguño’ one of the biggest drug traffickers in the world sent today, can disclaim this political statement.
“President Uribe, when he was not squandering money on U.S. public relations firms…”. It leaves me with no words.
“…appalling number of more than three million displaced Colombian civilians has kept Bogotá in the crossfire of criticism for its daily derelictions of such internally displaced persons, Uribe’s indifference to issues of social injustice and Colombian’s incredibly unequal distribution of wealth”. Whenever your analysts want to see the amount of money Colombia spends on attending displacement or the reduction in unemployment, or the growth in the number of people with state health coverage or access to education, to just give you some examples, they are welcome to get them so their analysis can be a little more informed.
“Harper clearly feels more at home with vending Canadian products to the region rather than Canadian ideals and has staunchly supported his decision to trade with Bogotá despite calls that he should refuse to do so due to that country’s appalling human rights record.” Wow! This really is an analytical phrase that needs to be recorded in the Guiness Book of World Records for its depth in intellectual achievement.
I don’t want to go further in the analysis of your political commentary that does a disservice to your organization. A couple of editors, that with the crisis in the newspaper industry shouldn’t be to difficult to get, could seriously improve your document in terms of making them real analysis that have truthful elements into it and therefore improve the debate about Colombia and the US which, I think, is the main purpose of your organization.
Sincerely yours,
Francisco Santos Calderón
Vicepresidente de Colombia
I read very carefully your “analysis” called Colombian Free Trade Pact Shot Down: One Step Forward for the U.S., One Back for Canada. Sincerely this opinion article, coming from a reputed organization such as yours that says it’s a non partisan, independent NGO or think tank, has so many tilted statements that it leaves much to be desired to be even called an analysis.
Let’s start with the title. It already has an opinion in it which, if you read carefully, is supported with phrases that also only can be called political statements. Let me pinpoint some:
“This is merely the latest devastating blow to the standing of Colombia’s hard-line right-wing president, Àlvaro Uribe, whose disapproval rating hit a high of 27 percent in a Gallup Poll published on July 14”. Sure any president in its fifth year with an approval of 65 % must be having “devastating” political problems.
“As well his imperious removal of Washington’s long-favored policy of being able to extradite Colombian felons upon request”. More than 500 extraditions in 5 years, ‘Rasguño’ one of the biggest drug traffickers in the world sent today, can disclaim this political statement.
“President Uribe, when he was not squandering money on U.S. public relations firms…”. It leaves me with no words.
“…appalling number of more than three million displaced Colombian civilians has kept Bogotá in the crossfire of criticism for its daily derelictions of such internally displaced persons, Uribe’s indifference to issues of social injustice and Colombian’s incredibly unequal distribution of wealth”. Whenever your analysts want to see the amount of money Colombia spends on attending displacement or the reduction in unemployment, or the growth in the number of people with state health coverage or access to education, to just give you some examples, they are welcome to get them so their analysis can be a little more informed.
“Harper clearly feels more at home with vending Canadian products to the region rather than Canadian ideals and has staunchly supported his decision to trade with Bogotá despite calls that he should refuse to do so due to that country’s appalling human rights record.” Wow! This really is an analytical phrase that needs to be recorded in the Guiness Book of World Records for its depth in intellectual achievement.
I don’t want to go further in the analysis of your political commentary that does a disservice to your organization. A couple of editors, that with the crisis in the newspaper industry shouldn’t be to difficult to get, could seriously improve your document in terms of making them real analysis that have truthful elements into it and therefore improve the debate about Colombia and the US which, I think, is the main purpose of your organization.
Sincerely yours,
Francisco Santos Calderón
Vicepresidente de Colombia
Regarding "Préval of Haiti—A Provisional Report Card: Grade B+"
Dear Coha,
While Mr. Glenwick's article on Haiti and the Preval government appeared accurate in the description of the current state of affairs in Haiti, he erred in stating that it was up to the government to replace the "restavec" system. This system of sending children that one cannot support to live with more affluent families is the result of poverty. I cannot imagine what Mr. Glenwick thinks that the government can do about it.
By all first hand reports that I have had from Haitians traveling back and forth between Santo Domingo, where I live, and Port au Prince, the Capital city is transformed with a sense of peace since last January. People are out on the streets at night. The University is open late in the evening. People are hopeful and optimistic.
Please continue to monitor and report the situation there, perhaps with a bit more depth of understanding.
Thank you.
Elizabeth Eames Roebling
www.elizabetheames.blogspot.com
While Mr. Glenwick's article on Haiti and the Preval government appeared accurate in the description of the current state of affairs in Haiti, he erred in stating that it was up to the government to replace the "restavec" system. This system of sending children that one cannot support to live with more affluent families is the result of poverty. I cannot imagine what Mr. Glenwick thinks that the government can do about it.
By all first hand reports that I have had from Haitians traveling back and forth between Santo Domingo, where I live, and Port au Prince, the Capital city is transformed with a sense of peace since last January. People are out on the streets at night. The University is open late in the evening. People are hopeful and optimistic.
Please continue to monitor and report the situation there, perhaps with a bit more depth of understanding.
Thank you.
Elizabeth Eames Roebling
www.elizabetheames.blogspot.com
Tuesday, September 18, 2007
Regarding "CAFTA’s October Referendum: A Death Sentence for Costa Rican Trade & Foreign Investment?"
Letter received 08/14/2007
The article seems generally well balanced (particularly by COHA standards) in presenting both the risks of CAFTA non-ratification by Costa Rica. However, I'm curious as to how you came up with the conclusion that "Without CAFTA, goods exported by the country to the U.S. can look forward to being subject to 35 percent tariffs." There is certainly a good possiblilty that Costa Rica will lose CBERA benefits in 2008 (as well as those under CAFTA-DR) if Costa Rica doesn't approve the agreement. However, that would mean that Costa Rica would be subject to U.S. MFN tariffs which average 3-4 percent ad valorem, since Costa Rica is a WTO member. (Some textile and apparel and footwear U.S. tariffs are much higher, but my impression is that Costa Rica isn't really interested in exports in either of those areas.)
If I am missing something please let me know.
Best Regards,
David A. Gantz
Samuel M. Fegtly Professor of Law and
Director, International Trade & Business Law Program
University of Arizona, Rogers College of Law
The article seems generally well balanced (particularly by COHA standards) in presenting both the risks of CAFTA non-ratification by Costa Rica. However, I'm curious as to how you came up with the conclusion that "Without CAFTA, goods exported by the country to the U.S. can look forward to being subject to 35 percent tariffs." There is certainly a good possiblilty that Costa Rica will lose CBERA benefits in 2008 (as well as those under CAFTA-DR) if Costa Rica doesn't approve the agreement. However, that would mean that Costa Rica would be subject to U.S. MFN tariffs which average 3-4 percent ad valorem, since Costa Rica is a WTO member. (Some textile and apparel and footwear U.S. tariffs are much higher, but my impression is that Costa Rica isn't really interested in exports in either of those areas.)
If I am missing something please let me know.
Best Regards,
David A. Gantz
Samuel M. Fegtly Professor of Law and
Director, International Trade & Business Law Program
University of Arizona, Rogers College of Law
Regarding "Lightning Mustn’t Strike Twice: Alan García Determined To Avoid Another Failure Which Could be Staring Him in the Face"
Letter received 07/02/2007
Dear Larry,
Yes, I think you are right about Garcia magnifying the importance of Chávez for campaign purposes, but I don't think he "mainly invented" the relationship. The relationship existed, and of course Chavez himself weighed in repeatedly to publicly attack Garcia, creating an even stronger image of Chavez's support for Humala. Garcia didn't have to invent anything.
Thanks for your good work,
Charles Kenney
Dear Larry,
Yes, I think you are right about Garcia magnifying the importance of Chávez for campaign purposes, but I don't think he "mainly invented" the relationship. The relationship existed, and of course Chavez himself weighed in repeatedly to publicly attack Garcia, creating an even stronger image of Chavez's support for Humala. Garcia didn't have to invent anything.
Thanks for your good work,
Charles Kenney
Regarding COHA's articles on India's growing role in Latin America
I read the article with interest and must compliment Alex Sánchez for both his articles recently on India’s emergence as a growing economic power and the relationship with Latin America.
May I point out that as a professional in the water sector that there is much to share between Brazil and India on how to manage urban waters and water in semi-arid area. I have seen the 1 million cisternas programme in northeast Brazil, which harvest rainwater.
This is absolutely akin to many such programmes in China and India. So there is much sharing of experiences to build on there too. It is good that the Asian giants and the Latin American people are increasingly sharing close ties. May this continue to increase.
Regards and complements once again,
Vishwanath S.
May I point out that as a professional in the water sector that there is much to share between Brazil and India on how to manage urban waters and water in semi-arid area. I have seen the 1 million cisternas programme in northeast Brazil, which harvest rainwater.
This is absolutely akin to many such programmes in China and India. So there is much sharing of experiences to build on there too. It is good that the Asian giants and the Latin American people are increasingly sharing close ties. May this continue to increase.
Regards and complements once again,
Vishwanath S.
Tuesday, September 11, 2007
Regarding "Brazilian Aviation Crisis – Mechanical Error Or Governmental Failure? Or a Metaphor for Brazil Under Lula’s Rule?"
The Truth Finally Gets Its Socks On by Joe Sharkey
Given that the two American pilots of the Legacy 600 are now on trial, in absentia, on criminal charges that carry prison time in Brazil, it’s interesting to see how conventional wisdom has finally evolved in Brazil to accommodate realities that were violently in dispute for many months after the Sept. 29 crash.
Take this article by Concetta Kim Martens of the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, a think-tank whose interests include “the formulation of rational and constructive U.S. policies towards Latin America.” The article was published on the organization’s Web site, www.COHA.org, and republished by Brazil Magazine (www.brazzil.com), where it drew lively reader comment.
Obviously, I have no quarrel with the essence of the article.
That’s because nearly every assertion in it was first made a long time ago on this blog. But that was way back when no one else in the media was even raising the issues of the soundness of Brazil’s air-traffic control system, or criticizing the reckless rush by the Brazilian government, military and Federal Police to criminalize the Sept. 29 accident and scapegoat the American pilots.
Now that accuracy is winning the battle, we need to encourage perspective to march forward. So I need to point out that the COHA article, while essentially correct in its points, shades history a bit. And as I sense we are nearing the point where journalism must tip its fedora to history, I am sure Ms. Martens will forgive my nit-picking.
For one thing, she muddies the facts a bit on the demeanor of air-traffic controllers after the accident. “Since the September 29 Gol crash over the Amazon, controllers felt unfairly targeted for splenetic criticism [my italics] they were receiving from the public, and reacted by staging several work stoppages …” she writes.
Didn't happen quite that way.
Here is what did happen:
First the American pilots were recklessly and, it seemed to me universally, scapegoated. It took a while for the public in Brazil to become aware of, or concede, the role of air-traffic control in the accident.
Remember how long the ex-defense minister, Wonderful Waldir Pires, loudly insisted that the pilots caused the crash by performing reckless aerial loop d loops over the Amazon? Nobody in power told him to put a lid on that nonsense, including his boss, the President, who won a runoff election amid the passions of the disaster, which had occurred two days before the polls opened.
Only in time did the general public, but not the authorities, acknowledge that the Sept. 29 crash had been set in motion by a series of egregious errors by air traffic controllers, who themselves were working in deplorable conditions with faulty equipment within a system beset with major technological deficiencies in radar and radio communications, especially over the Amazon.
Initially, as I argued last October, November and afterward, the air-traffic controllers' protests were basically a warning shot across the bow of government and military to not implicate air -traffic control in the blame.
What actually happened was that low-ranking controllers – fearing that they, too, might become scapegoats along with the pilots (which in fact ultimately happened) – clammed up while the American pilots remained in custody in Brazil.
While the pilots twisted in the wind, the core group of controllers who were on duty during the accident -- the people who knew, for example, that air-traffic control was aware of the transponder malfunction on the Legacy for 50 minutes before the crash and failed to raise the alarm -- remained silent, went to ground and refused to answer any questions, citing psychological trauma.
As the protests continued for months, air traffic in Brazil was thrown into chaos.
For months after the Sept. 29 accident, public sentiment, whipped up by xenophobic Brazilian media, had focused sharply and exclusively on the Americans as culprits. There was no “splenetic criticism” in Brazil of the air traffic controllers that I am aware of. Of course, I was raising criticism of air traffic control on this little blog. It wasn't splenetic -- though the outraged and verbally violent reaction to it certainly was.
Ms. Martens does zero-in effectively on some of the official nitwits who continually brayed that all was well in Brazil’s skies; that the Sept. 29 disaster was caused strictly by reckless, arrogant Americans; that Brazil’s skies and airports were under world-class supervision and that to say otherwise was a base calumny and an insult to the honor of the nation.
Of course, the official indignation all rang a bit hollow again in July, when another airplane crash killed 199 people at overcrowded, unsafe Congonhas Airport in Sao Paulo, Brazil’s busiest.
Wonderful Waldir Pires, the obstinate Defense Minister responsible for air-traffic control, was finally out the door. So was Jose Carlos “Sunshine” Pereira, who ran the airports authority and suggested that it was slander to suggest that anything, anything might be wrong with Brazil’s aviation system.
Sunshine Pereira ranks right up there near Wonderful Waldir as a classic character in this story. Pereira steadfastly insisted after the Sept. 29 crash, even as the evidence became manifestly clear that both aircraft had been put on a collision course at 37,000 feet by air traffic control, that “it is not the best moment to carry out changes” including addressing the inept military control of civilian aviation.
Later, as international aviation groups expressed outrage at the way Brazil had clumsily politicized and criminalized the Sept. 29 accident, and even after the second horrible accident in July, with 350 now dead in two disasters in 10 months, Sunshine Pereira stood by his rusty guns.
“Brazil does not need international help,” he proclaimed, inanely. “The crisis is ours. The dead are ours.”
Shortly after, he was ducked-walked off the deck.
But as Ms. Martens writes, the President remained in a defensive crouch. “The security of our aviation system is compatible with all other international standards,” Lucky Lula proclaimed. As recently as three weeks ago, Lucky Lula was still scoffing at the fact, otherwise widely accepted all over the world, that there are black holes and blind spots in air-traffic control radar and radio communications over the Amazon.
I assume Ms. Martens’ small deficiencies in context and nuance are a consequence of the demands of concise summary. She writes: “President da Silva’s government has come under a great deal of fire for failing to properly address the nation’s air-travel safety, an act that according to several aviation experts, and the adamant belief of a good deal of the public sentiment, led to the air disaster” [s]
Well, I'm here to repeat, for the record, that this "public sentiment" took a long time getting its socks on, and even longer to reach the level of being "adamant."
And I should also point out that, while public sentiment may well have finally come around to the truth, as Ms. Martens asserts, two American pilots remain on trial on spurious criminal charges that public sentiment realizes were trumped-up.
Given that the two American pilots of the Legacy 600 are now on trial, in absentia, on criminal charges that carry prison time in Brazil, it’s interesting to see how conventional wisdom has finally evolved in Brazil to accommodate realities that were violently in dispute for many months after the Sept. 29 crash.
Take this article by Concetta Kim Martens of the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, a think-tank whose interests include “the formulation of rational and constructive U.S. policies towards Latin America.” The article was published on the organization’s Web site, www.COHA.org, and republished by Brazil Magazine (www.brazzil.com), where it drew lively reader comment.
Obviously, I have no quarrel with the essence of the article.
That’s because nearly every assertion in it was first made a long time ago on this blog. But that was way back when no one else in the media was even raising the issues of the soundness of Brazil’s air-traffic control system, or criticizing the reckless rush by the Brazilian government, military and Federal Police to criminalize the Sept. 29 accident and scapegoat the American pilots.
Now that accuracy is winning the battle, we need to encourage perspective to march forward. So I need to point out that the COHA article, while essentially correct in its points, shades history a bit. And as I sense we are nearing the point where journalism must tip its fedora to history, I am sure Ms. Martens will forgive my nit-picking.
For one thing, she muddies the facts a bit on the demeanor of air-traffic controllers after the accident. “Since the September 29 Gol crash over the Amazon, controllers felt unfairly targeted for splenetic criticism [my italics] they were receiving from the public, and reacted by staging several work stoppages …” she writes.
Didn't happen quite that way.
Here is what did happen:
First the American pilots were recklessly and, it seemed to me universally, scapegoated. It took a while for the public in Brazil to become aware of, or concede, the role of air-traffic control in the accident.
Remember how long the ex-defense minister, Wonderful Waldir Pires, loudly insisted that the pilots caused the crash by performing reckless aerial loop d loops over the Amazon? Nobody in power told him to put a lid on that nonsense, including his boss, the President, who won a runoff election amid the passions of the disaster, which had occurred two days before the polls opened.
Only in time did the general public, but not the authorities, acknowledge that the Sept. 29 crash had been set in motion by a series of egregious errors by air traffic controllers, who themselves were working in deplorable conditions with faulty equipment within a system beset with major technological deficiencies in radar and radio communications, especially over the Amazon.
Initially, as I argued last October, November and afterward, the air-traffic controllers' protests were basically a warning shot across the bow of government and military to not implicate air -traffic control in the blame.
What actually happened was that low-ranking controllers – fearing that they, too, might become scapegoats along with the pilots (which in fact ultimately happened) – clammed up while the American pilots remained in custody in Brazil.
While the pilots twisted in the wind, the core group of controllers who were on duty during the accident -- the people who knew, for example, that air-traffic control was aware of the transponder malfunction on the Legacy for 50 minutes before the crash and failed to raise the alarm -- remained silent, went to ground and refused to answer any questions, citing psychological trauma.
As the protests continued for months, air traffic in Brazil was thrown into chaos.
For months after the Sept. 29 accident, public sentiment, whipped up by xenophobic Brazilian media, had focused sharply and exclusively on the Americans as culprits. There was no “splenetic criticism” in Brazil of the air traffic controllers that I am aware of. Of course, I was raising criticism of air traffic control on this little blog. It wasn't splenetic -- though the outraged and verbally violent reaction to it certainly was.
Ms. Martens does zero-in effectively on some of the official nitwits who continually brayed that all was well in Brazil’s skies; that the Sept. 29 disaster was caused strictly by reckless, arrogant Americans; that Brazil’s skies and airports were under world-class supervision and that to say otherwise was a base calumny and an insult to the honor of the nation.
Of course, the official indignation all rang a bit hollow again in July, when another airplane crash killed 199 people at overcrowded, unsafe Congonhas Airport in Sao Paulo, Brazil’s busiest.
Wonderful Waldir Pires, the obstinate Defense Minister responsible for air-traffic control, was finally out the door. So was Jose Carlos “Sunshine” Pereira, who ran the airports authority and suggested that it was slander to suggest that anything, anything might be wrong with Brazil’s aviation system.
Sunshine Pereira ranks right up there near Wonderful Waldir as a classic character in this story. Pereira steadfastly insisted after the Sept. 29 crash, even as the evidence became manifestly clear that both aircraft had been put on a collision course at 37,000 feet by air traffic control, that “it is not the best moment to carry out changes” including addressing the inept military control of civilian aviation.
Later, as international aviation groups expressed outrage at the way Brazil had clumsily politicized and criminalized the Sept. 29 accident, and even after the second horrible accident in July, with 350 now dead in two disasters in 10 months, Sunshine Pereira stood by his rusty guns.
“Brazil does not need international help,” he proclaimed, inanely. “The crisis is ours. The dead are ours.”
Shortly after, he was ducked-walked off the deck.
But as Ms. Martens writes, the President remained in a defensive crouch. “The security of our aviation system is compatible with all other international standards,” Lucky Lula proclaimed. As recently as three weeks ago, Lucky Lula was still scoffing at the fact, otherwise widely accepted all over the world, that there are black holes and blind spots in air-traffic control radar and radio communications over the Amazon.
I assume Ms. Martens’ small deficiencies in context and nuance are a consequence of the demands of concise summary. She writes: “President da Silva’s government has come under a great deal of fire for failing to properly address the nation’s air-travel safety, an act that according to several aviation experts, and the adamant belief of a good deal of the public sentiment, led to the air disaster” [s]
Well, I'm here to repeat, for the record, that this "public sentiment" took a long time getting its socks on, and even longer to reach the level of being "adamant."
And I should also point out that, while public sentiment may well have finally come around to the truth, as Ms. Martens asserts, two American pilots remain on trial on spurious criminal charges that public sentiment realizes were trumped-up.
Friday, August 31, 2007
Regarding "Brazil: A Scandal a Day..."
Hello COHA staffers,
I write because I have just read the simplistic and bombastic "Brazil: A Scandal a Day...". This analysis is an embarrassment to COHA. I do not make this claim because I am a huge Lula supporter. I am not. Yet I am an academic with decades of experience in Brazil and I am shocked at the tone and quality of the writing you have put out.
Yes, Brazil is corrupt. But Brazilian politics is not equal to Lula. And the explanations for the increase in corruption cases regarding the PT's own transparency makes a certain amount of sense. As does the claim that the PT's dismantling of customary ways of doing business has resulted in an increase in corruption cases. But I am not writing to contest 'facts.' Your author poo-poohs this to the detriment of the quality of her writing.
But I am not here to take issue with specific facts. Rather, I would like to register my horror at the extent to which your supposedly progressive analysts mimic quite perfectly the words published in the conservative VEJA. This is sad. The situation, including the airport issue, is much more complex than your analyst is able to make out. No wonder I increasingly skip your reports.
Best,
John Collins
Assistant Professor of Anthropology
CUNY
I write because I have just read the simplistic and bombastic "Brazil: A Scandal a Day...". This analysis is an embarrassment to COHA. I do not make this claim because I am a huge Lula supporter. I am not. Yet I am an academic with decades of experience in Brazil and I am shocked at the tone and quality of the writing you have put out.
Yes, Brazil is corrupt. But Brazilian politics is not equal to Lula. And the explanations for the increase in corruption cases regarding the PT's own transparency makes a certain amount of sense. As does the claim that the PT's dismantling of customary ways of doing business has resulted in an increase in corruption cases. But I am not writing to contest 'facts.' Your author poo-poohs this to the detriment of the quality of her writing.
But I am not here to take issue with specific facts. Rather, I would like to register my horror at the extent to which your supposedly progressive analysts mimic quite perfectly the words published in the conservative VEJA. This is sad. The situation, including the airport issue, is much more complex than your analyst is able to make out. No wonder I increasingly skip your reports.
Best,
John Collins
Assistant Professor of Anthropology
CUNY
Wednesday, August 08, 2007
Regarding "Chile's Aggressive Military Arms Purchases Are Ruffling the Region, Alarming in Particular Bolivia, Peru and Argentina"
Dear COHA,
The article is obsolescent and badly informed. Long gone are the days when military purchases through the copper fund were "autonomous", and the "military establishment" has long been "confronted" and has to negotiate for months with Hacienda to buy an extra box of ammunition if it is not already in the budget.
It is amazing that an institution of the prestige of COHA can come up with such utter rubbish, unless it is inspired by one of Chile's neighbours, or more likely, the ineptitude of its "research fellow".
As readers of my own reports would know, and those who are not that lucky could easily have found out if they read anything else than 15-year old papers by academics who do not know one end of a barrel from another, the military have not just lost political power (including the 4 designated senators inherited from the Pinochet constitution), and had their right to call the National Security Council and immunity of the commanders in chief from dismissal revoked, but their personal incomes are now one third of their civilian life equivalents (they were on par in 1990), their ordinary budgetary resources have not increased in real terms for years (contrary to expenditure in general which has been going up at up to double inflation), and several hundred of them have been prosecuted for human rights violations. The "bonanza" from the Copper Fund may be real on paper, but in practice the decision to spend it has been formally taken away from them by the Comtroller-General's office and de facto handed to Hacienda, which is sitting on decisions to the point of catching hemorrhoids. All this under the wrongly described "Socialist".
The only correct thing in the analysis is the existence of shortfalls in other areas and the risk of social unrest, but this has nothing to do with the Chilean military. There is no "guns or butter" debate or dilemam in Chile. There is money to spare for both.
Regards,
Armen Kouyoumdjian
Country Risk Strategist
Chile Member, SIPRI Defence Expenditure Network
The article is obsolescent and badly informed. Long gone are the days when military purchases through the copper fund were "autonomous", and the "military establishment" has long been "confronted" and has to negotiate for months with Hacienda to buy an extra box of ammunition if it is not already in the budget.
It is amazing that an institution of the prestige of COHA can come up with such utter rubbish, unless it is inspired by one of Chile's neighbours, or more likely, the ineptitude of its "research fellow".
As readers of my own reports would know, and those who are not that lucky could easily have found out if they read anything else than 15-year old papers by academics who do not know one end of a barrel from another, the military have not just lost political power (including the 4 designated senators inherited from the Pinochet constitution), and had their right to call the National Security Council and immunity of the commanders in chief from dismissal revoked, but their personal incomes are now one third of their civilian life equivalents (they were on par in 1990), their ordinary budgetary resources have not increased in real terms for years (contrary to expenditure in general which has been going up at up to double inflation), and several hundred of them have been prosecuted for human rights violations. The "bonanza" from the Copper Fund may be real on paper, but in practice the decision to spend it has been formally taken away from them by the Comtroller-General's office and de facto handed to Hacienda, which is sitting on decisions to the point of catching hemorrhoids. All this under the wrongly described "Socialist".
The only correct thing in the analysis is the existence of shortfalls in other areas and the risk of social unrest, but this has nothing to do with the Chilean military. There is no "guns or butter" debate or dilemam in Chile. There is money to spare for both.
Regards,
Armen Kouyoumdjian
Country Risk Strategist
Chile Member, SIPRI Defence Expenditure Network
Thursday, August 02, 2007
Regarding "Immigration Compromise too Little too Late"
Dear Mr. Birns,
Racheotes's piece on immigration to the USA is prologued by a caution paragraph tating that it "does not have the official imprimatur of either COHA or a number of the author's colleagues who feel that its thesis will be considered to be too controversial." (http://www.coha.org/2007/07/26/immigration-compromise-too-little-too-la
te-the-gates-should-be-opened-to-all-who-wish-to-come/)
Although it is not mentioned in the text, the article best epitomizes an attitude that many COHA readers would like to share with others. Mr. Racheotes's article makes us think of a world without frontiers, borders, passports, custom officers and migration restrictions. What would happen in such a world with arms and drugs trades, nationalist policies, and global trade? This is perhaps a too idealistic vision for diplomats, political leaders and bureaucrats who would be jobless in a borderless world (not to mention arms and drugs dealers). Therefore, the "real war on terror" proposed by the author would not only have an enemy on the fear strategists but also, and more important, an ideological goal.
Congratulations to Mr. Racheotes and your team for an excellent publication.
Kindest regards,
Edmundo Murray
Racheotes's piece on immigration to the USA is prologued by a caution paragraph tating that it "does not have the official imprimatur of either COHA or a number of the author's colleagues who feel that its thesis will be considered to be too controversial." (http://www.coha.org/2007/07/26/immigration-compromise-too-little-too-la
te-the-gates-should-be-opened-to-all-who-wish-to-come/)
Although it is not mentioned in the text, the article best epitomizes an attitude that many COHA readers would like to share with others. Mr. Racheotes's article makes us think of a world without frontiers, borders, passports, custom officers and migration restrictions. What would happen in such a world with arms and drugs trades, nationalist policies, and global trade? This is perhaps a too idealistic vision for diplomats, political leaders and bureaucrats who would be jobless in a borderless world (not to mention arms and drugs dealers). Therefore, the "real war on terror" proposed by the author would not only have an enemy on the fear strategists but also, and more important, an ideological goal.
Congratulations to Mr. Racheotes and your team for an excellent publication.
Kindest regards,
Edmundo Murray
Thursday, July 26, 2007
Regarding Immigration Compromise too little too late
Dear Alex,
You have offered an interesting thesis, and I would like to comment. I believe that your opinion – that the borders of this country should be totally open and immigration be legalized is shared by a certain segment of the American populace. However, the fact that this issue has remained in limbo is not related to any lack of intelligence or attention on Washington’s part. With American foreign policy going the way it is, perhaps less may be more with regard to the immigration issue. Clinton has been the latest and best example of this kind of diplomacy. He did not aggressively push NAFTA through congress, he asked the leaders of Latin America to come to Washington to address their new integration. He did not force Chile into NAFTA’s accords, he was respectful of the entire process as well as the interests of the American people. As we have seen here, America does not need another forceful policy endeavor, instead it would be more sensible to coordinate slower and more measured diplomacy to take the heat of Washington’s back and show the rest of the region that this is not an issue confined to Washington’s interests.
I do agree that opening the borders would be a positive move for the American market. America could soon see our economy stagnate given our dependence on foreign oil and the fact that our exports are not on par with Asia and the EU. If we could use immigration to help boost productivity we could move toward a more effective export model, which will probably be very important in the near future. Immigration therefore has the potential to keep us competitive in the case of devaluation while simultaneously helping to mend relations with Latin America.
Kai Smith
You have offered an interesting thesis, and I would like to comment. I believe that your opinion – that the borders of this country should be totally open and immigration be legalized is shared by a certain segment of the American populace. However, the fact that this issue has remained in limbo is not related to any lack of intelligence or attention on Washington’s part. With American foreign policy going the way it is, perhaps less may be more with regard to the immigration issue. Clinton has been the latest and best example of this kind of diplomacy. He did not aggressively push NAFTA through congress, he asked the leaders of Latin America to come to Washington to address their new integration. He did not force Chile into NAFTA’s accords, he was respectful of the entire process as well as the interests of the American people. As we have seen here, America does not need another forceful policy endeavor, instead it would be more sensible to coordinate slower and more measured diplomacy to take the heat of Washington’s back and show the rest of the region that this is not an issue confined to Washington’s interests.
I do agree that opening the borders would be a positive move for the American market. America could soon see our economy stagnate given our dependence on foreign oil and the fact that our exports are not on par with Asia and the EU. If we could use immigration to help boost productivity we could move toward a more effective export model, which will probably be very important in the near future. Immigration therefore has the potential to keep us competitive in the case of devaluation while simultaneously helping to mend relations with Latin America.
Kai Smith
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